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“The terrorist threat is real, yet Islamic charities are not guilty by default.”1 
Introduction  
On May 8, 2015 the Conservatives won the general election in England and Wales, gaining 326 
seats to form a majority administration and are therefore able to govern without the need for a 
coalition or formal agreement with other parties.2 David Cameron´s second reappointment as 
Prime Minister also influences the counterterrorism policies of the UK. In his first meeting with 
the new National Security Council on May 13, 2015, Cameron revealed his plans for a new 
Counter-Extremism Bill, which will include the empowering of the Charity Commission to root 
out charities that misappropriate funds towards extremism and terrorism. Additionally the Bill 
contains further immigration restrictions on extremists.3 Since the efforts for a new counter-
terrorism Bill are not new on the agenda of the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats had 
previously blocked their proposals three times during the period of their coalition from 2010-
2015.4 As reason for the blocking the Liberal Democrats expressed concerns that the UK 
counter-terrorism legislation is illiberal and does not tackle the problem it is designed to solve.5 
This unease with the UK´s counter-terrorism legislation is also felt by civil rights organizations 
like Human Rights Watch or the umbrella organization for the voluntary sector in England the 
National Council for Voluntary Organizations (NCVO). Both Human Rights Watch and the 
NCVO published studies in 2007 that critique the UK´s counter-terrorism strategy. While 
Human Rights Watch focuses on the harmful impact these legislations have on human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ralf Mohammed Kroessin. “Islamic Charities and the ‘War on Terror’: dispelling the Myths,” Humanitarian 
Practice Network 38 (2007): 27. 
2 “Election Results: Conservatives win Majority,” BBC News, accessed June 2, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-32633099.  
3 “Counter-Extremism Bill: National Security Council Meeting,” UK Parliament, accessed June 2, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/counter-extremism-bill-national-security-council-meeting. 
4 “UK Anti-Extremism Bill is Cameron Priority in New Program,” Bloomberg Business, accessed June 2, 2015. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-12/u-k-anti-extremism-bill-will-be-in-queen-s-speech-
cameron-says. 
5 Ibid.  
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and how they undermine the rule of law and damage communities, NCVO examines the 
counter-terrorism legislations impact on the charity sector.6 
Concerns about the impact of the counter-terrorism legislation on Muslim 
communities in the UK are rising. The NCVO already state in its 2007 study that the 
“juxtaposition of Islam with terrorism by politicians and the media… has cast a shadow of 
suspicion over Muslim communities in the UK.”7 This atmosphere also worries UK-based 
Muslim NGOs. The Muslim Charities Forum expressed their unease with this statement: 
There are a disproportionate number of Muslim Charities facing inquiries, and this 
combined with the Charity Commission’s own admission that Islamist extremism is 
the “most deadly” problem, prejudice seems inevitable. The Charity Commission is 
partially responsible for cementing the public perception that Muslim charities are 
problematic and it needs to do more to alleviate fears in the sector and public at large, 
seeing as it plays an instrumental role in the public perception of Muslim Charities.8 
Being under surveillance by politicians and media, Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) in the UK have the ability to raise huge annual budgets ranging from 5 million to 82 
million pounds and are important actors inside the humanitarian aid field. Although the UK 
government took on more soft measures in their “War on Terror” against Muslim NGOs, 
there was still an overreaction against these organizations.9 Leading to a sharp dichotomy 
between “Islam” and “the West,” the “War on Terror” discourse has negatively impacted 
Muslim NGOs, invoking chilling effects against everything that is termed “Islamic.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Hearts and Minds; Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom Counterterrorism Policy,” Human 
Rights Watch, accessed June 9, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/uk0607/uk0607web.pdf. 
Nolan Quigley and Belinda Pratten, “Security and Civil Society; The Impact of Counter-terrorism Measures on 
Civil Society Organisations,” NCVO (2007), accessed June 9, 2015, http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-
areas/government-issues/social-policy/ncvo/137971security_and_civil_society_a_report_from_ncvo.pdf. 
7 Quigley and Pratten, “Security and Civil Society,” 12. 
8 “Response to the Consultation on Draft Protection of Charities Bill, 2014,” Muslim Charities Forum, accessed 
19 May, 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-
protection-of-charities-bill-committee/draft-protection-of-charities-bill/written/16722.html. 
9 Jonathan Benthall, “The Overreaction against Islamic Charities,” ISIM 20 (2007): 6-7. 
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Against this background I will offer a case study of four UK-based Muslim NGOs, 
analyze how they interact and position themselves vis á vis the UK government and Charity 
Commission legislation and policy. In this perspective I show that these organizations, like any 
other organization, are complex ideologically-based actors, with their own organizational 
culture, struggling to provide aid in the way they judge to be the most appropriate, and in doing 
so, being shaped by and in turn shaping the context out of which they have grown. I attempt to 
understand how meaning associated with “Islam” and “aid” are produced, expressed, contested 
and reworked by actors in these organizations. Studying the ideologies of the four UK-based 
Muslim NGOs is first and foremost a study of (re) presentations. Focusing on discourse in the 
sense of narratives, texts and rhetorical struggles, this is mainly about how these organizations 
(re)present themselves and their work rather than about how they conceptualize themselves.10 
Analyzing the question how counter-terrorism legislation impacts the work of UK-based 
Muslim NGOs, I will conceptualize their contribution to the mainstream development aid and 
analyze how they maneuver in relation to the wider context of aid. In answering this research 
question, I attempt to nuance the commonly drawn picture of these organizations in presenting 
how they negotiate between the British governments and Charity Commissions counter-
terrorism strategies, the wider humanitarian aid field and the existing fear and suspicion 
towards everything termed “Muslim” or “Islamic”. In will frame this analysis within the 
context of the UK´s “War on Terror”.  
To structure my argument this thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter 
provides an overview on the existing literature of Muslim NGOs discussing theories of NGOs 
and defining how religion, Islam and ideology are used in this thesis. Faith-Based 
Organizations. Furthermore I will introduce the basic concepts of Islamic aid culture relevant to 
the organizations discussed here and look at the dichotomies between a more mainstream 
development aid culture and the Islamic aid culture. The second chapter focuses on the counter-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
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terrorism legislation in the UK in general and especially on the UK government’s and Charity 
Commission´s counter-terrorism strategies. Chapter three focuses on the case study of their 
organizational culture examining their ideology of aid; how they operate, meaning with which 
organizations are they fostering partnership; how do thy formulate their visions; objectives; 
implement their strategies and how do they perceive aid. The fourth chapter focuses on the 
actual impact of the UK´s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST and PREVENT on the 
abovementioned Muslim NGOs as well as on the limitations and possibilities of Muslim NGOs 
operating in the international humanitarian aid field. Finally the conclusion draws together 
some of the key findings, reflecting on the research question and providing an outlook on the 
further role of Muslim NGOs as actors within the humanitarian aid field. Having outlined my 
research question and the structure of this thesis I will now proceed to introduce the 
methodology of thesis as well as the terminology.  
Methodology  
The methodology of this thesis primarily consists of a critical discourse analysis studying how 
social power, dominance, and inequality are reproduced and shaped by laws, text and talk in 
the social and political context surrounding Muslim NGOs in the UK. Taking on a members-
groups approach, I will examine the language used in discourse on counter-terrorism 
legislation and the provision of aid as well as analyzing the members of Muslim NGOs, the 
UK government and the Charity Commission. By taking on a members-groups approach I 
mean that language users engage in discourse as members of social groups, organizations or 
institutions and that groups thus may act “by” their members.11 In doing so I attempt to bridge 
the micro and macro level.12  
Focusing on UK-based Muslim NGOs working within an international environment 
whose main operational arena is overseas and their headquarters are in the UK, this case study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. D. Tannen, D. 
Schiffrin and H. Hamilton, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 354.  
12 Ibid. 352-371. 
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is based on predefined criteria. These criteria include that the abovementioned organizations 
are primarily or largely committed to relief and development aid. Additionally these 
organizations are constituted with a board of directors/ trustees and registered under British 
charity law. Starting out with a pool of potential cases, I gradually reduced to four 
organizations on which I will base this thesis. Turning to Muslim NGOs in the UK and 
encountered difficulties with counter-terrorism measures, I examine two organizations that 
the Charity Commission has investigated, Interpal and Muslim Aid, and two organizations 
that were not subject to inquiry but nevertheless encountered difficulties with counter-
terrorism measures, Islamic Relief Worldwide and Muslim Hands. Furthermore the search for 
case studies has invariably been influenced by preexisting knowledge on Muslim NGOs as 
well as on the political system in the UK. Moreover the search was influenced by my 
language skills. Since my skills in Arabic are basic I turned to case studies that offered 
material in English. Because of these circumstances I decided to turn to UK-based Muslim 
NGOs in this thesis. In this thesis I will mainly focus on charitable relief and development 
organizations since these organizations are working in conflict areas abroad and therefore 
have to negotiate and are concerned with the UK government´s and the Charities 
Commission´s counter-terrorism strategies. Working within this realm, Islamic Relief, 
Muslim Aid, Interpal and Muslim Hands are walking a tightrope, balancing, on the one hand, 
their own ideologies of aid and their religious identity and, on the other hand, the 
professionalization of the humanitarian aid field and the counter-terrorism legislation 
strategies. This thesis is predominantly based on qualitative data, including a review of 
available literature, website information, project documents, annual reports, financial 
statements, brochures, policy papers and newspaper articles. 13  These documents reflect 
official representational discourse presented by the organization rather than by individuals in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although I present the key findings of my thesis here, I faced some difficulties, which limit the scope of this 
thesis and are open to further research. I was not able to collect data from interviews with the organizations and 
different parties involved. 
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the organizations. Since there was not the opportunity for studying internal organizational 
documents such as e-mails, or documents from staff meetings, these documents reflect how 
these organizations want to be received by the public.  
Terminology 
That the term “Faith-Based Organizations” is not unproblematic or even simple reveals the 
amount of recent literature on this topic and the difficulties authors have defining the term. 
Giving the impression that Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) are homogeneous, these studies 
sometimes undermine the heterogeneity of these organizations and the ways in which their 
faith identity plays in their work. Furthermore, this heterogeneity does not only stem from 
different world faiths but can also be seen in each faith as well.14 Rick James warns that any 
generalization invites criticism for over-simplification and by treating “FBOs as distinct he 
identifies the danger of underplaying the universal ‘human’ element. FBOs as well as secular 
organisations are all staffed with human beings and therefore experience many of the same 
organisational issues and challenges. It is clearly impossible to separate the significance of 
non-religious values or religious values in individual people, let alone organisations.”15 
In view of the fact that faith is highly personal, it is important to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of what religion and faith means to these four Muslim NGOs and what 
role faith identity plays in these organizations. Finding a clear definition of what faith-based 
means instead of the catchall term FBO also helps to clarify what faith means to an FBO. 
Therefore a catchall term confuses and does not pay attention to how a particular FBO wants 
to be present itself and be represented by their staff and partners. Ignoring the differences 
between FBOs also neglects the role donors and political decision-making plays when 
supporting and funding an organization. Although donors were reluctant in funding FBOs in 
the past they are now more open to these kinds of organizations, nevertheless there is a broad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Rick James, “What is Distinctive about FBOs? – How European FBOs define and operationalize their faith,” 
International NGO Training and Research Centre, Praxis Paper 22 (2009), 4.  
15 Ibid. 5 
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spectrum of FBO ranging from organizations where faith plays a subsidiary role to 
organizations, which also engage in political and social action as well as in proselytizing.  
Elizabeth Ferris acknowledges that there is no generally accepted definition of faith-
based organizations, nevertheless different authors define the term as a “… broad one 
reflecting the difficulties in developing a definition which draws a connection between 
different faith traditions and a multitude of organizational expressions.”16 Since the literature 
is not clear on a general definition of a FBO, in this thesis I will refer to what Ferris defines 
as: “…organizations affiliated with a specific faith tradition, but even then there are major 
differences between organizations in terms of their relationship with established religious 
structures, the degree to which considerations of faith are reflected in their work, the scale of 
their operations, their ways of working and their understanding of the political and social 
context in which they operate.”17 This definition of FBOs captures the wide field of diverse 
FBOs, which are often seen as a monolithic whole in the literature, but like Ferris argues, the 
gap between FBOs is sometimes wider than that between any given FBO and its secular 
counterpart.18  
In this thesis, I will however refer to Muslim NGOs as FBOs, incorporating the 
aforementioned definition by Ferris, which views FBOs as organizations affiliated with a 
specific faith tradition. Like Bruno De Cordier, I understand Muslim NGOs to mean that they 
were founded on the initiative of Muslims, mobilizing most of their support among Muslims, 
and whose action is to a certain degree inspired and legitimated by the Islamic religion.19  
 Differences between FBOs give rise to problems of interpretation. Therefore a 
typology of FBOs can help to conceptualize Muslim NGOs. In chapter one I dive deeper into 
the conceptualizing of Muslim NGOs and introduce a typology I find helpful to differentiate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Elizabeth Ferris. “Faith and Humanitarianism: It´s Complicated,” Journal of Refugee Studies 24, no. 3 (2011), 
607.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 606-625. 
19 Bruno De Cordier, “Faith-based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline: An Analysis of Western-
based Muslim Aid Organisations,” Disasters 33, no. 4 (2009) 609. 
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different types of FBOs. However, before I turn to the literature review and provide an 
overview on the existing literature relevant for this thesis as well as further conceptions 
significant to ground the case study of the four Muslim NGOs.   
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review  
Aiming to analyze NGOs in the context of the “War on Terror” in the UK, it is relevant to 
examine the field of NGO-studies, humanitarianism and development aid culture. Before 
analyzing the organizational culture of the four Muslim NGOs I examine in this thesis the 
vocabulary these organizations engage with needs to be clarified. Therefore this chapter will 
mainly focus on a literature review of both the field of NGO-studies and humanitarianism in 
general and, the study and development of Muslim NGOs and an Islamic aid culture in 
particular.  
NGO-Studies, Humanitarianism and Development Aid Culture  
The term “NGO” grew out of the development system and was introduced by the United 
Nations (UN) in 1945.20 In the 1970s and 1980s, mostly American and European NGOs 
became more prominent in the development culture, which was evident in the rising numbers 
of newly founded NGOs. Despite the growing number of NGOs, there has been an extended 
practice of charity long before the term “NGO” emerged. This prominence however can be 
seen as a part of a broader process of globalization and an increasing awareness of the 
limitation of nation states. Peterson defines this culture of development aid as a “culture of 
modernity, shaped in particular by Enlightenment and Christian ideas of a common humanity 
and the duty to assist strangers.”21  
The growing number of NGOs notably since the 1980s brings not only positive but also 
negative consequences with it. Although NGOs proclaim to do “good”, they cannot per se be 
perceived as something “good”. The dangers and negative consequences of humanitarian aid 
have been subject to many studies during the last 30 years. One of the most prominent 
approaches stems from Mary Anderson´s 1999 book Do no Harm – How Aid Can Support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma? - Ideologies of Aid in four Transnational Muslim NGOs, 
(Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2011), 80. 
21 Ibid. 72.  
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Peace – or War.22 Nevertheless, recently the subject of NGO-studies changed to more 
organizational and institutional questions such as accountability and evaluation of potential 
negative consequences for both the recipients of aid as well as NGOs themselves. Moreover, 
the ability of NGOs to meet their long-term goals and to function as political actors and 
incubators of an alternative development are debated.23  
The field of NGO-studies is housed within political science, sociology and development 
studies and more recently in anthropology, too. While political science mainly focuses on 
how NGOs influence public policy and business policy and how they contribute to an 
emergence of global civil society, sociology examines the power asymmetries and social 
movements. 24 Moreover scholars of international relations have begun to “examine the 
impact of NGO coalitions and networks on international politics and their role in the 
formation of an international civil society.”25 Since this literature often stemming from 
political sciences is critiqued because of its simple categories and generalizations, 
anthropologists rather focus on how discourses about NGOs create knowledge; define sets of 
appropriate practices and how reductionist views of NGOs as fixed and generalizable entities 
can be avoided.26 In contrast, the study of “religious NGOs” is relatively new. Julia Berger 
published the first analysis of this type of organization in 2003, defining them “as formal 
organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of 
one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a nonprofit, independent, 
voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Mary B. Anderson, Do no harm – How Aid can support Peace-or War, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999). 
23 Nicola Banks, and others, “NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still too close for Comfort?,” World 
Development 66 (2015): 707-718. Gerhard Clarke, “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in 
the Developing World,” Political Studies 46, no. 1 (1998): 36-52. William F. Fischer, “Doing Good? The 
Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” Annual Review Anthropology 26 (1997): 439-464. 
24 Erica Johnson, and Aseem Prakash, “NGO Research Program: A collective Action Perspective,” Policy 
Sciences 40, no. 3 (2007): 221-240. 
25 Fischer, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,“ 440.  
26 Ibid. 441.  
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the national or international level.”27 These organizations form a unique hybrid of religious 
beliefs and socio-political activism while operating in the same legal and political frameworks 
of secular civil society.28  
Given the fact that this thesis focuses on humanitarian aid and development organizations, 
it is vital to focus on the concept of humanitarianism. Moreover looking at the dichotomies of 
aid in chapter two, it has to be clear what is meant by development aid culture. Defining 
humanitarianism is problematic, and there are different approaches to study the meaning and 
practice of humanitarianism from a historical perspective. Definitions of humanitarianism that 
largely rest on the independent, neutral and impartial provision of aid, drawing on the 
boundaries of humanitarianism so that there is no hint of politics or power romanticize 
humanitarianism´s history and deny that meaning and practices of humanitarianism are 
historically fluid as the world it operates in.29 The ideal humanitarian act, however, is 
perceived as an altruistic, motivated desire to protect lives and provide relief adhering to the 
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and do more good than 
harm.30 Since the criteria used to define humanitarianism are not clearly defined, it is little 
surprise that there is a debate on what qualifies as a humanitarian organization.31  
 To understand what is referred to when using the term “development aid culture” in 
this thesis, I provide a brief overview on the periods of humanitarianism out of which the 
development aid culture emerged. Forms of humanitarianism occurred in the early 19th 
century. The foundation of two main institutions, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in 1864 and the emergence of the humanitarian law mark this first period of 
humanitarianism. 32 As a consequence of the flagrant inhumanity during World War II, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Julia Berger, “Religious Non-Governmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,“ accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.global.ucsb.edu/orfaleacenter/luce/luce08/documents/Harvard%20Summary%20paper.pdf, 1.  
28 Ibid. 4.  
29 Michael Barnett, and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question – Politics, Power, Ethics, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press 2008),10. 
30 Ibid. 11. 
31 Ibid. 14. 
32 Ibid., 21.  
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idea of human dignity led to a new period marking the establishment of the UN, the 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions, all normative humanitarian pillars. Likewise 
during this period, there was an emergence of mainly Christian humanitarian organizations 
such as Lutheran World Relief, Church World Service, and Caritas International. After the 
First World War humanitarian action was also directed outside of Europe reflecting colonial 
expansion.33 This period however is subject to critical analysis of humanitarian aid. Barnett 
and Weiss argue. “Although humanitarianism was often invoked as an alibi for interest-based 
interventions, in many cases it came to oppose colonial sentiments and actions.”34 It was in 
the period of decolonization when humanitarian organizations first focused on what was then 
called “third world” or “global South.” Newly established organizations like Caritas 
International, Church World Service, and Lutheran World Relief, which were established, as a 
response to the suffering in Europe, turned international.35 It was after the end of the Cold 
War that the number of newly founded NGOs increased. A growing importance of civil 
society and neo-liberalist agenda supported the turn around from state-led aid provision to the 
foundation of NGOs and other types of humanitarian organizations.36  
It was after the attacks on September 11, 2001 that the perception of humanitarian aid 
changed again and which is the most relevant perception of humanitarian aid relevant to the 
scope of this thesis. Remarkably in the United States, counterterrorism and humanitarianism 
became “crime-fighting partners,” meaning that humanitarian organizations became part of 
campaigns to convince the public of the goodness of the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the name of stability and freedom.37 Ironically it was the same US government under the 
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opinion-files/8439.pdf, 5.  
34 Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question, 22. 
35 Ibid. 23. 
36 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 80. 
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administration of George W. Bush that implemented hard measures against Muslim NGOs, 
accusing them of founding terrorism and spreading extremist views.  
 Before engaging further into the dichotomies of development aid culture and Islamic 
aid, I will briefly discuss the debate on how Muslim NGOs are best explored and analyzed 
and how I myself will approach these organizations in my thesis. This is important since there 
is an ongoing debate on how to define and conceptualize Muslim NGOs. Academics discuss 
whether it is more appropriate to approach them as faith-based organizations rather then like 
any other secular NGO. Furthermore it is debated if the term faith-based organization is 
applicable to every NGO since they are ideological actors based on their own “faith” like 
human rights etc.  
Conceptualizing Muslim NGOs  
Posing the question on how Muslim NGOs can be conceptualized, I refer to the ongoing 
academic debate on Faith-Based Organizations. Clarifying the term “FBO”, and further 
explanation of this debate is necessary when studying how Muslim NGOs define and position 
themselves.  
 Given the relatively expansive literature on religious and legal concepts of 
philanthropy and almsgiving in Islam, the organizational level of Muslim charities as well as 
transnational Muslim NGOs have historically received little scholarly attention. This changed 
after 9/11 when some politicians and journalists concluded that certain Muslim charities and 
NGOs were financing terrorist activities by using humanitarian programs.38 Meanwhile much 
of the literature focusing on transnational Muslim NGOs stems from political science and 
terrorism studies, which identify Muslim NGOs as political actors and analyze them as 
supporters of militant networks, national political parties and resistance groups mainly in 
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Palestine, Sudan, Afghanistan and elsewhere.39 A third strand of literature is growing out of 
law and international relations studies, focusing on the legal implications of anti-terror 
legislation for Muslim NGOs and NGOs in general. Neglecting the influence of religion, 
development studies only began to focus on studying FBOs in the last ten years.40 This 
change in development studies stems from a number of reasons: First, the increasing visibility 
of religion in the public sphere challenges narratives of modernization and secularization. 
Here the Iranian Revolution in 1979 was only one event that challenged the international 
development community´s attitude towards religion.41 Second, there has been an increase in 
the actual number of FBOs. The World Bank´s study Voices of the Poor (2000) underlines the 
importance of such religious organizations especially for the poor. It concluded that people 
have more trust in FBOs than in secular NGOs.42 The third event is an internal shift in 
development studies from modernization theory to more heterodox approaches leading to an 
opening of the humanitarian space to the inclusion of religious actors in academic studies.43 
Séverine Deulin and Carole Rakodi invoke that this internal shift requires a reassessment of 
two fundamental assumptions in development studies, namely: “that the significance of 
religion will decline as societies modernize, and that the political space can and should be 
strictly separated from the religious space.”44 
Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein point out another reason for the interest in 
religious-based action in humanitarianism. They argue that humanitarianism underwent three 
waves of globalization. In the first wave, the spread of Western aid agencies to nearly all parts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 11. 
40 Recent studies on FBOs include: Gerard Clarke, “Faith Matters: Faith-based Organisations, Civil Society and 
International Development,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006):835-848. Bruno De Cordier, 
“Faith-based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline: An Analysis of Western-based Muslim Aid 
Organisations,” Disasters 33, no. 4 (2009): 608-628. Severine Deneulin and Carole Rakodi, “Revisiting 
Religion: Development Studies Thirty Years On“, World Development 39, no. 1 (2010): 45-54. Elizabeth Ferris. 
“Faith and Humanitarianism: It´s Complicated,“ Journal of Refugee Studies 24, no. 3 (2011): 606-625. Michael 
Barnett, and Janice Gross Stein, Sacred Aid – Faith and Humanitarianism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
41 Deneulin and Rakodi, “Revisiting Religion,” 46. 
42 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 24. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Deneulin, and Rakodi, “Revisiting Religion,” 46. 
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of the world led to new kinds of cross-cultural encounter. The second wave was characterized 
by an explosion of agencies predominantly from America and Europe working in conflict 
zones in the global South; endeavor to identify common vocabularies and standards. This 
wave was dominated by secular agencies such as the Red Cross Movement. However, in the 
third wave there was a growth in both transnational religious activism and humanitarian 
agencies from outside Europe. During this period, the relationship between donor 
governments and faith-based organizations were strengthened, leading to a rise in official 
assistance headed to religious organizations.45 It is within this third wave of globalization 
categorized by Barnett and Gross Stein that Muslim NGOs became more visible in the 
humanitarian aid field. 
The 1998 Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics by the World Bank or more 
recently the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) partnership note On 
Faith Based Organizations, Local Faith Communities and Faith Leaders in 2014 are example 
for practitioner and donor-oriented initiatives. This particular literature reveals some weak 
spots compared to the studies published by universities and research institutions. Marie 
Petersen critiques three major points of the literature that stems from the fact that the interest 
in faith-based organizations has grown out of development NGOs and donor organizations 
rather than academic environment.46 First, she criticizes that when writing from within the 
development paradigm, it takes development for granted as an ontological and uncontested 
reality. Furthermore, she states that it would be useful to consider development as something 
ideological or religious in its meaning.47 Second, focusing explicitly or implicitly on the ways 
in which FBOs can be practical tools in the implementation of development activities, this 
strand of literature tends to be instrumentalist. “It is about the ways in which religion can be 
instrumentalized for providing good development, often through faith-based organizations; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Barnett and Stein, Sacred Aid – Faith and Humanitarianism, 8-7. 
46 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 26. 
47 Ibid. 
	   16	  
not more fundamentally about the ways in which religion shapes the ways in which 
development is conceptualized.”48 The third point Petersen makes here is that much literature 
on faith-based organizations is apt to take “religion” as a relatively unproblematic and largely 
positive category. Here she sees the risk of simplifying the term “Faith-Based 
Organizations.”49 In conclusion all of the abovementioned strands of literature on Muslim 
NGOs in terrorist studies and political science, law, and international relations studies as well 
as the literature on faith-based organizations in development studies are characterized by an 
instrumentalist understanding of transnational Muslim NGOs. Although this literature fails to 
provide an analytical tool for understanding, they might be relevant as objects to study in 
themselves since they reflect a dominant discourse in the post September, 11, 2001 aid field. 
This discourse however reflects the kind of religion that is promoted and accepted by 
mainstream development actors; it also it also reveals their prevailing views on Muslim 
NGOs.50 Furthermore Petersen states that this new focus on FBOs, together with the “War on 
Terror” brought Muslim NGOs into the mainstream aid field. By doing so she states that 
Muslim NGOs now “…have to navigate in an environment of increasing regulation and 
control, but with simultaneous openings for cooperation and funding.”51 Introducing a new 
kind of Muslim aid that is easily compatible with mainstream aid holds particularly true for 
UK-based Muslim NGOs like Islamic Relief or Muslim Aid which I will highlight in chapter 
three.52  
When discussing FBOs or NGOs influenced by a certain faith, it is debatable whether 
it is more appropriate to use the term “religious” instead of faith-based. The argument goes 
that the term faith-based indicates that non-religious NGOs are not faith-based. Taken that the 
defining characteristic of NGOs is their claim to “do good” they are highly ideological actors 	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51 Marie Juul Petersen, “Trajectories of transnational Muslim NGOs,” Development in Practice 22, no.5-6 
(2012), 774. 
52 Ibid. 
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and therewith they are to some degree faith based. In promoting a certain “faith” over others, 
regardless if that faith is human rights, development, secularism or Islam.53 Looking at all 
humanitarian actors as variants of faith-based organizations and not differentiate between 
secular and faith-based organizations is a significant approach when discussing Muslim 
NGOs.54 Andera Paras and Janice Gross Stein come to the conclusion that “(the) boundaries 
between secular and religious organizations are fuzzy rather than sharp. Humanitarian space 
and human rights embody the sacred for both secular and religious humanitarians and are 
sanctified by both. Constructions of the sacred influence how organizations understand the 
nature of humanitarian action and their own identities as humanitarian actors.”55 Recently 
Barnett and Gross Stein published a collection of articles focusing on this topic. Analyzing 
whether religious humanitarian are better prepared than secular humanitarian to navigate the 
boundaries between the sacred and the profane, the authors discuss the importance of faith in 
humanitarian aid.56 Furthermore Paras and Gross Stein argue that the degree to which 
religious identity contributes to the success and legitimacy of humanitarian organizations is 
overestimated.57 That religious organizations are better prepared to negotiate with the political 
and the profane within the sacred space of humanitarian principles is due to the circumstance 
that they live in several worlds in which they must negotiate the sacred and the profane on a 
daily basis.58 “More so than any other large humanitarian organization, Islamic Relief lives in 
multiple worlds. Partly through circumstances and partly through design, it brings the 
sensibilities of both the sacred and the profane to the construction of humanitarian space.”59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 35. 
54 When discussing faith-based and secular organizations it is vital to take a closer look at the concept of “ 
Humanitarian space” which represents humanitarianism´s central values. The humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, impartiality, independence, and universality constitute and bound humanitarian space. For deeper 
analysis of the concept see: Andera Paras and Janice Gross Stein, “Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in 
Humanitarian Life,“ in Sacred Aid – Faith and Humanitarianism, ed. Michael Barnett, and Janice Gross Stein 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 213. 
55 Paras and Gross Stein, “Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life,“ 211. 
56 Barnett and Gross Stein, Sacred Aid – Faith and Humanitarianism. 
57 Paras and Gross Stein, “Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life,” 211. 
58 Ibid. 229. 
59 Paras and Gross Stein, “Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life,” 222. 
	   18	  
That these issues are not only discussed by academics but also on a practical level are found 
in a statement by Dr. Hany El Banna, co-founder of Islamic Relief and the Muslim Charities 
Forum.60 Dr. El Banna prefers the concept of “value-based organization” instead of FBOs.61 
Nevertheless it is helpful to work with a FBO typology in order to differentiated 
between different kind of FBOs and to analyze how important faith is in their organizational 
culture, motivation for action or when working with partners and beneficiaries. Gerald Clark 
provides a FBO typology that distinguishes between a passive, active, persuasive or exclusive 
FBO.62 In a Passive FBO, based on his typology, faith is subsidiary to broader humanitarian 
principles as a motivation for action, mobilizing staff and supporters. Moreover it plays a 
secondary role in identifying, helping or working with beneficiaries or partners. For the active 
type on the opposite, faith provides an important and explicit motivation for action. It plays a 
direct role in identifying and in the everyday work of an organization. The persuasive and 
exclusive types of a FBO aim to bring new converts to the faith and engage in social and 
political actions. 63  In which type an organization fits depends on how it chooses to 
operationalize its faith in different areas such as motivation of staff; mission; choice of staff, 
partners and beneficiaries; organizational culture and funding. In chapter three I will examine 
these different areas of four Muslim NGOs in the UK and analyze in which of these types 
they fit.  
Concentrating on how Muslim NGOs understand the role of religion and how and 
when they “Islamize” terms and use a specific ideological foundation of aid, it is vital to 
conceptualize these terms and discuss how they are employed in this thesis. In what follows, I 
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will introduce particular concepts of religion, Islam and ideology in order to build my case 
study on the four Muslim NGOs on these concepts. 
Defining Religion, Islam and Ideology 
Talal Asad´s Genealogies of Religion is one of the best-known concepts of religion. Thus, in 
this thesis I will neither refer to Clifford Geertz´s view on religion as a “cultural system” nor 
to Talal Asad`s critique of Geert´s view. Rather, I will turn to Bruce Lincoln´s conception of 
religion, which is a response to Talal Asad´s Genealogies of Religion. Agreeing with Asad 
that in a definition of religion both discourse and practice must be included, but Lincoln takes 
it one step further and includes the domain of institutions and community. All these four 
domains, which are; discourse, practice, institutions and community are according to him “… 
necessary parts of anything that can properly be called a ‘religion’.”64 Furthermore he states 
that each macro-entity called “religion” has internal varieties and sub visions, which undergo 
their own historic process of development and change.65 Therefore things, people, ideas etc. 
are not religious per se but become so by giving them religious meaning through religious 
discourse, practices, communities or institutions. Hence something becomes religion by being 
“religionized” – or “sacralized.”66  
 Taken into consideration that religious meaning one gives to things, ideas, people or 
organizations is shaped by discourse, practices, and institutions, I seek to avoid the 
essentialism that is easily produced by speaking about “Islam” as a single system. Moreover I 
argue along the same line of thinking as Asad, that there cannot be anything like a universally 
accepted account on a living tradition such as “Islam”. Furthermore writing about a tradition 
always is from a certain narrative relation. This means that I am writing form my personal 
historical, political and sociological background and that there cannot be a thing like a neutral 
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position. As Asad states in his essay “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” “Any 
representation of tradition is contestable. What shape that contestation takes, if it occurs, will 
be determined not only by powers and knowledge’s each side deploys, but by the collective 
life they aspire to – or to whose survival they are quite indifferent. Moral neutrality, here as 
always, is no guarantee of political innocence.”67 
Throughout my thesis I will use the term Muslim NGOs in lieu of Islamic NGOs. In 
doing so, I refer to Peter Mandaville´s understanding of studying Muslims instead of Islam: 
On my understanding, to speak of a Muslim (in Arabic, “one who submits”) is simply 
to speak of a subject-consciousness which considers itself to posses or practice a form 
of identity which derives from something called Islam, regardless of what form one´s 
consciousness of the latter takes. I chose to emphasize the `Muslim` then, in order to 
orient this study towards exploring the self-descriptions of those who consider 
themselves to be practicing something called Islam.68 
Meaning that Islam does not refer to a specific set of beliefs or practices, but rather that it 
functions as an abstraction through which meaning and discourse can be organized.69 In doing 
so, I correspond with Petersen when she states that she is treating “Islam not merely as one 
example of the more general category religion, but rather as a discursive construct which 
operates as an important bearer of social meaning within particular communities.” 70 Like 
Petersen, I understand that the analysis of transnational Muslim NGOs cannot merely be 
about identifying the role of Islam in development aid based on predetermined notions of 
Islam, but rather about the conception of “Islam”; asking to how and when the 
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abovementioned Muslim NGOs “Islamize” things, and what kinds of “Islam” they construct 
in their activities.71 
 In what follows, I outline how I define ideology in this thesis. By “ideology,” I neither 
refer to political aspects nor to class-motivated bourgeoisie deceptions. Instead, like Petersen I 
understand ideology−like discourse−as an aspect of social life “… the idea that human 
individuals participate in forms of understanding, comprehension or consciousness of the 
relations and activities in which they are involved; a conception of the social that has a 
hermeneutic dimension, but which is not reducible to hermeneutics.”72 When focusing on 
Muslim NGOs ideologies of aid “ …can be understood as meaning systems that center on 
questions of aid provision …, are formulated and shared by actors involved in the provision of 
aid … with the purpose of guiding and motivating them in their provision of aid, as well as 
justifying and promoting their agenda in the public, garnering support among potential donors 
and partners and ensuring their legitimacy in doing so.”73  
 Before delving into the case study of the four UK-based Muslim NGOs, it is necessary 
to provide a brief overview of the history of Islamic aid culture and the most important 
concepts and traditions of charitable giving in Islam. This short introduction of these practices 
of charitable giving helps in understanding how the abovementioned organizations deal with 
perceptions of aid in their daily work. Moreover, it engages discussion on how certain Muslim 
NGOs integrate certain concepts, traditions, and values heralded in both Islam and Islamic aid 
culture into their vision and mission statements.  
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Brief History of Islamic Aid Culture: Zakat and Sadaqa  
In what follows I refer to Petersen´s term of “Islamic aid culture,” which focuses on those 
organizations in the Middle East, although there are countries like Indonesia and Malaysia 
that experienced similar trends and have a long history of Islamic aid.74 Islamic aid culture is 
closely connected to social welfare and social movements. Long before the institutionalization 
of Muslim NGOs, there had been a tradition of institutionalizing aid in form of religious 
endowments (waqf). Below I will give a short introduction into the development and history 
of the Islamic aid culture and its most important theological concepts and traditions of 
charitable giving, which are still important today and are applied by Muslim NGOs.75  
Theological concepts and traditions of charitable giving are embedded in Islam and 
have a long legal tradition. However this thesis does not provide a detailed historical 
overview of these concepts; instead, it focuses on the most important ones – namely zakat (the 
obligatory alms tax) and ṣadaqa (volunteer almsgiving) – which until recently have 
influenced the Islamic aid culture. Since charitable giving has a long history in the Islamic 
tradition it is bound to the life of Muhammad. Numerous concepts of this tradition as well as 
their implementation are found in the Qur’an and the Hadith-literature. “The prophets own 
behavior was perceived as exemplary in the matter of almsgiving and his generous and 
selfless behavior was a model to be emulated.“76  
Zakat and sadaqa are two important concepts of charitable giving and can be seen as 
the first social security systems.77 Additionally to these concepts, which are still implemented 
by the here discussed Muslim NGOs there is another Islamic tradition of charitable giving 
important to the work of these organizations. Although it is too broad to discuss each of these 
concepts in detail, I will nevertheless list them here. Besides the distribution of food parcels 	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during Ramadan, the abovementioned Muslim NGOs also distribute meat to people in need 
on the Eid al Adha. This tradition to sacrifice an animal on at the end of the hijra is called 
qurabani anchored in the Qur´an for example in Surah 108. 2 “So turn in prayer towards your 
Lord and sacrifice (animals).“ Similar important to the charitable giving of food is the caring 
for orphans, which all four Muslim NGOs adhere too. Caring for orphans is deeply embedded 
in charitable concepts in Islam and there is a rich literature in the Qur´an and hadith-
literature.  
Zakat 
Zakat, as the obligatory alms tax that should be donated by each Muslim, is the third of the 
five pillars of Islam. Besides the religious meaning it also has a social one since it attempts to 
distribute wealth righteously in society. This alms tax is meant to control social stability and 
solidarity.78 “Under the ideal scheme which wide observance of zakāt would make possible, 
the rich do not become poor, but the poor cease to be poor.”79 Currently there are only a few 
countries in which zakat is still obligatory, such as Pakistan and Sudan, for example. Other 
countries like Jordan and the Palestinian territories have their own department for religious 
affairs and zakat committees that regulate its donation and distribution. In Morocco and 
Oman, however, the donation of zakat is a private matter.80 A special model of zakat is zakat 
al fitr, which is a special alms tax donated during the feast breaking at the end of Ramadan. 
Today it is widespread and an important and inseparably part of social Muslim culture as well 
as individual Muslim Identity.81 
Debated is the question whether zakat should only be distributed to needy Muslims or 
if the theological concept should also include its distribution to non-Muslim recipients of aid. 
Currently the interpretation is dominated by liberal Muslim jurists saying that the concept 	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embraces both Muslim and non-Muslim recipients of aid. Islamic Relief states on its website: 
“Zakat is not just a fundamental pillar of Islam – it is also a revolutionary concept with the 
potential to ease the suffering of millions around the world.”82 In a 1999 article Jonathan 
Benthall contends that while Islamic Relief also includes non-Muslim recipients in their 
projects, Muslim Aid sticks to a more conservative interpretation of the concept and adjusts 
its projects to Muslims only.83 Islamic Relief states, “To be eligible to receive zakat, the 
recipient must be a poor Muslim. A poor person is someone whose property in excess of his 
basic requirements does not reach the value of the nisab threshold.”84 This statement stands in 
contrast to the organizations aim to provide aid to people regardless of their race political 
affiliation, gender or belief. 85  Muslim Aid on the other hand refers to the categories 
mentioned in the Qur´an but mainly people who are poor and suffering are eligible to receive 
zakat money.86 In their mission statement the organization however claims that it is serving 
humanity.87 Based on the fact that Benthal´s article was published more than 15 years ago, it 
appears that these organizations underwent a change in their ideology of aid. Petersen states 
in her 2011 published study: “Recipients are no longer understood in terms of fellow Muslim 
brothers and sisters in a global Muslim ummah, but as part of global humanity.”88 I will take 
up this change in the perception of aid and recipients of aid in chapter three.  
Sadaqa 
Ṣadaqa refers to volunteer alms giving, and like zakat, it is mentioned in the Qur´an yet the 
two terms are not clearly differentiated.89 In a particular passage from the Qur’an ṣadaqa is 
mentioned in connection to the life of Muhammad: “O you who have believed, when you 
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[wish to] privately consult the Messenger, present before your consultation a charity. That is 
better for you and purer. But if you find not [the means] - then indeed, Allah is Forgiving and 
Merciful. (Q 58:12)” Examining the hadith-literature, this concept is broad including not only 
material donations but also non-material ones. Thus it can also include a smile given to a 
stranger or person in need or the passing on of knowledge.90  
The concept of ṣadaqa plays a relevant role when it comes to the work of Muslim 
NGOs since this concept, unlike the concept of zakat, does not underline strict regulations in 
donating. Here however the room for different projects is wider and can also include cultural 
and ecological projects.91 
Having outlined the history of Islamic concepts of almsgiving and charity I will now 
turn to the Muslim NGOs themselves. By focusing on the dichotomies between a 
development aid culture predominantly developed in Europe and America and an Islamic aid 
culture, I examine how UK-based Muslim NGOs balance and negotiate between these two 
different cultures of aid.  
Dichotomies of Aid? – Muslim NGOs as Part of Development Aid Culture and Islamic Aid 
Culture 
Both the culture of development aid and Islamic aid laid out general conditions of possibilities 
for the emergence of transnational Muslim NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, 
the transnational system for the provision of aid was institutionalized by the culture of 
development aid and became dominant in terms of economic transfer as well as language. On 
the other hand, Islamic aid culture budged a connection between Islamization and social 
welfare. Muslim diaspora groups in Europe and North America contributed to the 
establishment of new donors and transnational structures of zakat distribution.92 Against this 
background Petersen argues that Muslin NGOs can be seen “… as sites of cultural encounters 	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– this is where the cultures of development aid and Islamic aid meet. … They can be seen as 
an interface between different aid cultures, as sites for the intricate interplay and joint 
appropriation of different bodies of knowledge.”93 Furthermore both cultures of aid cannot be 
seen as stable concepts for they change due to political, economic and social contexts. Having 
emerged as responses to and being shaped by processes of modernization, colonialization, and 
globalization, these cultures underwent multiple changes throughout time. Although both 
cultures experienced the same processes their promoter interpreted these in different ways, 
leading to different aid cultures.94 Four events had a large influence on Muslim NGOs, 
including Muslim NGOs diaspora organizations based in Europe and Muslim NGOs in the 
Middle East. These events were: the famine in the Horn of Africa in the 1980s, the war in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, the war in Bosnia in the 1990s and the 9/11 attacks on New York 
and Washington in 2001.95 It was especially in the Afghan and Bosnian wars that Muslim 
NGOs were suspected of involvement in and funding of militant activism and the 
mujahedeen. Seeing the mujahedeen as ally in the fight against the Communists, the US 
government turned a blind eye to such relations.96 This however changed after the Cold War 
and the involvement of Muslim NGOs in the 1993 and 1998 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the US embassy in Kenya.97 These suspicions were further intensified after the 
September 11th attacks.  
Focusing on the differences or dichotomies between these two aid cultures, Petersen 
identifies three significant dichotomies: First, the dichotomy between solidarity and 
universalism. While universalism came to be a central value in development aid, solidarity 
and brotherhood are central to Islamic aid, binding Muslims together in a community. Second, 
there is a dichotomy between neutrality as a core value of development aid, shaped by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 83.  
95 Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 90. 
96 Petersen, “Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs after 9.11,” Voluntas 23 (2012), 134. 
97 Ibid. 
	   27	  
Western humanitarian organizations and justice growing out of political movements in the 
Islamic aid culture. Finally Petersen describes the dichotomy between secularist and the 
religious meaning that the culture of Islamic aid is based on a notion of religion as all 
encompassing including the provision of aid, whereas the culture of development aid rests on 
a principally secular understanding of aid.98 
Acting within both cultures of aid, UK-based Muslim NGOs can be designed as 
cultural bridge builders. Growing out of a Muslim diaspora in Europe and America, the afore-
mentioned Muslim NGOs are facing the difficulty of dealing with both cultures of aid. Their 
self-identification as a religious organization is a necessary strategy in their daily work when 
negotiating with the dominantly secular humanitarian aid field. Recently these strategies and 
the ability to negotiate with day to day politics, especially in the field of counter-terrorism 
legislation, is even more important to Muslim NGOs than to any other NGO working in the 
humanitarian aid field.  
The politics and notably the counter-terrorism legislation that Muslim NGOs in the 
UK have to deal with will be outlined in the following chapter. The framework I outlined 
above helps to understand the case studies I will analyze in chapter three. Nevertheless, before 
I can turn to examine these cases it also needs the political and legal framework in which 
counter-terrorism legislation in the UK is created and how and when it influences Muslim 
NGOs. Therefore the next chapter outlines the most important counter-terrorism legislations 
and strategies as well as the entities involved in this process.   
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Chapter 2 
Counter-terrorism legislation in the UK  
Currently counter-terrorism legislation is highly debated in politics, media, civil society and 
academia.99 In the last ten years, the UK government`s counter-terrorism legislation was 
subject of several studies claiming that it is not only a threat to human rights but also harms 
Muslim communities across the UK. The Forum against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) 
conducted a survey in 2004 “Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in 
an Open Society,” examining the concerns of British Muslims related to the counter-terrorism 
measures.100 In another study, they state, “Victimization of Muslims under the antiterrorism 
legislation has lead to increased incidences of Islamophobia and racism against Muslims.”101 
Human Rights Watch published a report in 2010 Putting Human Rights at the Center of 
United Kingdom Counterterrorism Policy, accusing the government that the counter-terrorism 
laws do have a harmful impact on human rights, undermining the rule of the law and 
damaging the relations and trust to British Muslims.102  Both the targeting of Muslim 
communities throughout the UK and the atmosphere of fear and suspicion against everything 
rendered “Muslim” and “Islam” has also led to a change in the British citizen´s attitude 
towards diversity. After the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, this debate was further fueled 
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by the news that that the perpetrators were British citizens.103 Furthermore classifying 
Muslims as a distinct community, counter-terrorism laws reinforce the feeling of separation 
on the one hand, while on the other hand, they distinguish between British and Muslim 
loyalties causing the feeling that one has to be either the one or the other.104 
After the attacks on the Paris office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in 
January 2015, and the attacks in Copenhagen on the 16th of February stimulated a public 
debate on counter-terrorism legislation and security not only in the UK but also in other 
European countries like Germany and France.105 These wide-ranging changes in regulatory 
and legal context i.e. counter-terrorism legislation have an impact on non-governmental 
public action and on the work of organizations working in international development and 
humanitarian aid in general and Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in 
particular. To make things even more complicated, UK-based Muslim NGOs do not only 
have to deal with UK counter-terrorism legislation. Organizations like Islamic Relief or 
Muslim Hands also have to stick to European Union legislation and United Nations 
Regulations on counter-terrorism.106  
The Humanitarian Practice Network published a working Paper in 2014 on “Counter-
terrorism Laws and Regulations – What Aid Agencies Need to Know,” concluding that 
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counter-terrorism legislation affects all humanitarian organizations.107 Kate Mackintosh and 
Ingrid Macdonald are concerned that humanitarian organizations are influences by counter-
terrorism legislation on three levels, namely: structural level, operational level and internal 
level.108 The main concerns they currently face are: access to funding that had become more 
limited; the administrative burden has increased, and the fear of exposure to possible 
sanctions under counter-terrorism measures had influences on the programming priorities.109 
In their recent published working paper, Victoria, Mecalfe-Hough and Tom Keating 
interviewed British international NGOs. The interviewed NGOs highlight their concerns that 
some aspects of the UK counter-terrorism legislation are too vague and open to wide 
interpretation.110 Dr. Hani El Banna, co-founder of Islamic Relief has observed, “I think 
counter-terrorism legislation is preventing us from having access to the neediest people” 111 
Hereafter I discuss the current UK government´s112 counter-terrorism strategy in 
general and then focus on the main legal acts, orders and measures that directly influence the 
work of the charity sector. I will take a closer look at the draft “Protection for Charities 
against Terrorist Abuse,” which is being discussed since November 2014 in the Parliament. 
Since these legislations impact not only Muslim NGOs but also the whole charity sector, this 
chapter will outline the discourse on counter-terrorism legislation and humanitarian aid in the 
UK. 
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UK´s “War on Terror” and the Charity Sector  
Especially British non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in international 
development and humanitarian aid are affected by counter-terrorism legislation and policies 
that negatively impacting their work.113 Current conflict zones with a high risk of affiliation 
with terrorism like Syria, the Gaza Strip, Iraq and Somalia pose enormous difficulties to 
emergency relief operations.114 Challenges relating to the security of staff, physical access, 
logistics and the compliance to different counter-terrorism legislations make the work in the 
field even harder for humanitarian organizations. Therefore counter-terrorism legislation 
poses a challenge to the charity sector when organizations are obliged on the one hand to 
deliver aid to the needy and therefore have to get access to them, but on the other hand are 
restricted to talk and negotiate with terrorist affiliated groups.115 Humanitarian organizations −no matter if they are faith-based or secular−are facing a dilemma in these aforementioned 
high risk conflict zones because civilians most in need are located in these territories. 
Although the real threat posed by terrorism should not be downscaled, the measures 
undertaken by the UK government are likely to have the opposite effect. Instead of robust 
action to counter terrorism these measures tend to undermine “… rather than protecting the 
interests of charities and their ability to provide aid to those who need it most and distracting 
attention from the particular risks that leave some organisations vulnerable to abuse by 
terrorists.”116  
Although all UK-based NGOs working in the development and humanitarian aid sector 
are confronted with these issues and monitored by the government and the Charity 
Commission, according to reports Muslim NGOs are under closer scrutiny than secular or 
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other faith-based NGOs.117 Examining the counter-terrorism of both, the UK government and 
the Charity Commission provides an insight into different perceptions and the realities 
growing out of these legislations for the Muslim NGOs relevant for this thesis.  
The main actors focusing on the UK government´s counter-terrorism strategy are: the 
Department for International Development (DFID), HM Treasury and the Home Office. 
Terrorism-specific legislation has a longer history in the UK than in other European countries 
and dates back to 1974 when the political situation in Northern Ireland and the terrorist 
attacks of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was troubling the UK.118 After the al-Qaeda 
attacks on 11 September 2001, the Terrorism Act (2000) was modified and expanded by the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001.119 Currently the most important 
regulations and laws concerning the activity of the charity sector are besides the 
aforementioned: the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter 
Terrorism Act 2008, the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010 and the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011. 120  Especially the ATCSA is being criticized by for 
restricting civil liberties and human rights.121 Moreover it is described as “the most draconian 
legislation (the UK) Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a century.” 122 
Challenging the work of humanitarian organizations, these measures and legislations 
contributed to uncertainty within the charity sector. Working in high-risk conflict zones the 
counter-terrorism legislation worries organizations working there making, it nearly impossible 
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to negotiate with actors in the field without trespassing counter-terrorism legislations.123 
Especially the engagement with proscribed individual or groups is the main concern of many 
organizations. David Anderson, the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 
highlights this issue in his 2014 report:  
It has been suggested to me… that there are criminal offences under UK anti-terrorism 
legislation, which are also capable of impeding the legitimate activities of international 
NGOs in conflict areas. Among those which may need particular consideration in this 
respect are:  
a)TA (Terrorism Act) 2000 section 12: see in particular sections 12(2)(b) and 12(3), 
which criminalize the arranging and addressing of meetings to “further the activities” of 
proscribed organizations.; 
b)TA (Terrorism Act) 2000 section 14-18, which create general offences relating to 
the provision of funds or other property to individuals who use them for the purpose of 
terrorism.124 
On the one hand, Anderson recommends the adoption of statutory provisions similar to 
those in Australia and New Zealand, which do accept exemptions for engaging with 
proscribed groups.125 On the other hand, he suggests, “that a dialogue be initiated between 
international NGOs and policy makers, including in the Home Office and Treasury, with a 
view to exploring how the objectives of anti-terrorism law can be met without 
unnecessarily prejudicing the ability of NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid, capacity-
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building and peace-building in parts of the world where designated and proscribed groups 
are active.”126 
Discussing the recent counter-terrorism legislation in the UK, one must be certain 
what is meant by the definition “terrorism” that is used in this setting. Since there is no 
coherent international definition of “terrorism,” each country defines on its own what it 
understands as “terrorism”. The legal definition of “terrorism” implemented in Section 1 of 
the Terrorism Act (2000) states,“ the use or threat of action where…the use or threat is 
designed to influence the government or an international governmental organization or the 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”127 Referring to “actions,” this 
definition includes those which “[involve] serious violence against a person” or “serious 
damage to property,” “endangers a person´s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action,” “creates as serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public,” 
or is “designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”128 This 
definition however is open to criticism because it is wider than in other countries´ 
jurisdictions since it includes the threat to commit an act, as well as its actual commission.129 
What is even more striking is “...the manner in which ‘support’ to terrorism has been 
interpreted directly impacts upon the work of humanitarian organizations."130 
UK counter-terrorism strategy – CONTEST and PREVENT 
In 2003 the UK government first developed its counter-terrorism strategy 
“CONTEST.” Elaborated by the Home Office, this strategy consists of four work streams, 
which are called the “four P´s”: PREVENT: to stop people becoming terrorist or supporting 	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terrorism; PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks; PROTECT: to strengthen the protection against 
a terrorist attack; and PREPARE: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. The aim of 
CONTEST is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas form terrorism, so that 
people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.”131 The independent advocacy 
organization CAGE published a report on the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, 
stating that PREVENT was created as first an all-encompassing social policy to target almost 
every aspect of Muslim life.132 Furthermore, the report that after the London bombing in July 
2005 the British government created a taskforce to prevent “Violent Muslim Extremism” 
under the CONTEST strand. Since then PREVENT has undergone a number of revisions both 
in 2011 and in 2013.133 This policy however was critiqued not only by the charity sector but 
also notably by various Muslim NGOs and Muslim communities in the UK. London-based 
independent advocacy organization CAGE134 published a report on the PREVENT strategy, 
critiquing its widespread curtailment of the freedoms and rights of British Muslims. Claiming 
that PREVENT policy is a central part of the domestic “War on Terror” and seen as the 
leading blueprint for counter-terrorism policy by politicians across the world, CAGE 
expressed concern that these measures negatively impacted Muslim communities. 135 
Criticizing the approach of the strategy, the CAGE report found: 
PREVENT incorrectly conflates defeating and ideology (which it describes as 
`Islamism`) with defeating terrorism. All terrorists and acts of political violence have 
an ideology or goal. However, terrorism and political violence is not caused by 
ideology, it is a methodology. Rooting out an ideology or in this case a theology will 	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not end Politically Motivated Violence (PMV) because it does not address the political 
causes. PREVENT focuses on dealing with religious and political ideology as a means 
of dealing with PMV. Instead of addressing the political struggles that lead to violence 
that need a solution.136 
The objectives of PREVENT are “to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism 
and the threat we face from those who promote it, to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support, and work with a wide 
range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet, health) 
where there are risks of radicalization which we need to address.”137 Charities are defined as 
“outward facing and inclusive, not inward looking or for private benefit. They should not be 
exclusive clubs that only a few can join against strict membership criteria. If a charity runs a 
debate or forum that excludes people of certain faiths or views this could breach charity law 
requirements. We will be looking at this further with the Charity Commission.”138 In both the 
PREVENT strategy of 2011 and in its 2014 annual report, the government stresses the 
important role of the Charity Commission as adviser and controller of the charity sector and 
therefore they are consulting on supporting the Commission to better enable their action.139 
Furthermore, the Charity Commission has fully embraced PREVENT with the appointment of 
a new Chairman, William Shawcroos, who is regarded with mistrust and criticized by many 
Muslim charities for his position towards Muslim communities, ideology, extremism and 
terrorism140 In his first interview after his appointment as Chairman Shawcross said, "The 
problem of Islamist extremism is not the most widespread problem we face in terms of abuse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Ibid. 
137 “PREVENT-Strategy,” UK Parliament, accessed May 4, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-
review.pdf.  
138 Ibid. 
139 “Contest, the United Kingdom´s strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report for 2014,” HM 
Government, accessed May 4, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415708/contest_annual_report_fo
r_2014.pdf. 
140 Belaon, “Muslim Charities a suspected Sector,” 6. 
	   37	  
of charities, but is potentially the most deadly. And it is, alas, growing.“141 As Chairman, he is 
responsible for accurately and responsibly representing the views of the Commission Board. 
Additionally he leads the board in making sure “the commission carries out its statutory duties 
and responsibilities and exercises its legal powers appropriately,” “carries out the board´s 
plans for the future, including its contribution to legislative reform,” and “carries out its 
service in line with agreed targets.”142 Being criticized not only for the appointment of the 
new chairman but also for the membership of Peter Clarke, who is a Charity Commission 
Board Member and former head oft he Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Metropolitan Police.143 
These factors however concern Muslim charities to be subject to greater intervention and 
surveillance by the Charity Commission.144 
Charities under the Law: Security Measures to “Protect the Charitable Sector from Terrorist 
Abuse” 
The primary legal framework for UK Charities is the Charities Act (2011 and 2006). 
In this legislation, “charity” is defined as “an institution that is established for charitable 
purpose only, and falls to the subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction with respect to charities.”145 Charities in England and Wales are obliged to 
register with the Charity Commission if they have an annual income of more than £5.000 or 
are charitable-incorporated organizations. Furthermore, registered charities are subject to a 
range of legal obligations under the charity law: “They must submit information on their 
activities, including accounts, to the Charity Commission on an annual basis; they must tell 
the Charity Commission and the public about their work; they must only conduct activities 
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that are considered `charitable` in law; they must be run by trustees who do not benefit from 
the charity; and they must be independent.”146 
In May 2007, the Home Office and HM Treasury published the consultation paper 
“Safeguards to Protect the Charitable Sector (England and Wales) from Terrorist Abuse.” 
Posing a number of specific questions and inviting comments on a set of recommendations by 
the government, the Charity Commission and several sector umbrella organizations led to an 
assessment of “…existing safeguards within the charitable sector and identified the key 
requirements for an effective, proportionate response to this evolving terrorist threat.”147 
Although most respondents agreed that this was an important issue, they gave a fair warning 
not to overestimate the threat since the scale of terrorist links to charitable action is relatively 
small compared to the size of the sector.148  
 In November 2014 the House of Parliament appointed a Joint Committee to scrutinize 
the draft Protection of Charities Bill and to recommend any changes, based on the evidence it 
received and reported to the House of Parliament in February 2015. The draft Bill would 
amend the Charities Act 2011 by making a number of changes especially to the powers of the 
Charity Commission. Furthermore it gives the Charity Commission a number of new 
investigatory and inquiry powers and the new power to issue a statutory warning.149 Besides it 
examines concerns “raised about the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on the charity 
sector and recommends that the government brings forward new legislation to ensure that 
genuine humanitarian work in conflict zones are not hindered by the 'chilling effect' of laws 
designed to counter-terrorism.”150 Although there are some critical voices that are concerned 
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with the potential abuse of power and the Commission's defective policy on extremism151 the 
majority of charities - including some Muslim NGOs ones – utilized the opportunity to give 
evidence before the government on their main concerns regarding the charity and counter-
terrorism legislation.152 However the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF) expressed concern that 
the inappropriate application of Charity Commission rules and broader counter-terrorism 
lawsare perceived to unfairly target Muslims. At the same time they challenge the assumption 
made by the draft Bill like the exaggeration on the number of charities “at risk” when it 
comes to the abuse from terrorism. MCF highlights that this assumption is overestimated and 
the costs of an innocent charity responding to a mistaken Charity Commission investigation is 
underestimated.153 Additionally the approach of the Charity Commission to publish the names 
of organizations under investigation is criticized, because it may lead to a damage of a 
charities’ reputation when it is innocent of contravening counter-terrorism legislation.154  
The Charity Commission and its Function as Controller of the Charity Sector 
The main tasks of the Charity Commission are to register and regulate charities in England 
and Wales and to ensure the public can support charities with confidence. It is a non-
ministerial government department and answers directly to the Parliament.155 Responsibilities 
of the Commission include the registration of charities, taking enforcement action, ensuring 
that charities meet their legal requirements, publishing appropriate information about each 
registered charity and providing only service and guidance to the charities.156 The Charities 
Act 2011 sets out the objectives, general functions, and general duties of the Charity 	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Commission in sections 13-20. 157  In their 2013-2014 annual report the Commission´s 
chairman Shawcross stated that the organization is undergoing rapid changes. Not only is the 
funding position of the Commission unstable. According to Shawcross, the weaknesses in 
current legal powers are undermining the ability of the Commission to be an effective 
regulator.158 The funding and the legal powers of the Charity Commission are another theme, 
which is also discussed in the draft Protection of Charities Bill. The Bill however tries to 
equip the Charity Commission with enlarged powers. Charities expressed their concerns on 
budget cuts for the Charity Commission and claimed that the Commission would focus more 
on their role as controller then on the role to guide and support charities: “The Government 
made cuts about three or four years ago which crippled the Charity Commission. We need the 
Charity Commission to be empowered by having the right funds to regulate and to engage, 
and to build the capacity of charity organizations.”159  
The Charity Commission's 2008 Counter-terrorism Strategy 
Evaluating terrorism as a serious and continual threat to UK society and to the charity sector, 
the Charity Commission developed a counter-terrorism strategy in 2008. Stating that the risk 
of terrorist abuse does not affect the whole charity sector on equal terms and can take a 
variety of forms - including exploiting charity funding, abusing charity assets, misusing a 
charity name and status – the Commission abandons a “one-size fits all” approach.160 
Tackling the threat of terrorism abuse the Charity Commission outlines a four-strand 
approach embracing: 
• awareness; aims to prevent abuse by raising awareness in the sector of risk.  
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• oversight; proactively monitoring the sector. 
• co-operation; strengthen partnership with government regulators and law enforcement 
agencies both nationally and internationally. 
• Intervention: examining each case individually and taking into account whether the 
trustees have acted reasonably and responsibly when deciding its regulatory 
response.161 
This strategy is developed in line with the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy 
CONTEST, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, and the recommendations 
by the Financial Action Task Force.162 Focusing on support and guidance to the charities is 
one of the approaches the Commission uses to prevent problems and abuse in the first place. 
Furthermore when suspicions arise that a charity is involved or has links to terrorist affiliated 
groups/persons the Commission states they would act proactively, swiftly and effectively. 
Where we have evidence or serious suspicion of terrorist abuse involving charities we 
will investigate proactively and swiftly. We also deal with counter-terrorism related 
issues in our monitoring visits programme. We submitted evidence to the Home 
Affairs Select Committee inquiry into counter-terrorism, which focuses on the Pursue 
strand of CONTEST in October 2013.163 
The Commissions handling, in the case that a charity is misused for terrorist purpose, is 
constructed on three key principles: First, they will not register an organization that has 
supported terrorism explicitly or implicitly; second, the use of a charities´ assets for support 
of terrorist activity is not a proper use of those assets and is illegal; and third links between a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Ibid.  
162 “Background Information on the Charity Commission and UK governments Counter-Terrorism Strategies,” 
Charity Commission, accessed May 3, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396157/CT-1-M2.pdf.  
163 “Tackling Abuse and Mismanagement – Report of Charity Commission´s investigations and compliance case 
work,” Charity Commission, accessed May 4, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313371/tam_2012_13.pdf. 
	   42	  
charity and terrorist activity spoil public confidence in the integrity of charities.164 Developing 
guidance the Charity Commission supports charities, especially trustees, to fulfill their legal 
duties, which include managing risks to protect their charity; acting lawfully; and maintaining 
public trust and confidence. Along with this support for charities, the guidelines aim to raise 
awareness amongst trustees of the legal requirements in relation to both criminal law and 
charity law.165 
Making it difficult for humanitarian organizations but especially for Muslim NGOs to 
carry out their work, counter-terrorism legislation influences the core values of the 
humanitarian space. 166 At this point, I turn to the specific areas in which Muslim NGOs are 
influenced by counter-terrorism legislation and what this means for them to work as Muslim 
FBOs in the humanitarian aid field.  
After having discussed the counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and the theoretical 
approach to Muslim NGOs in chapter one and two, I will now discuss how the above-
mentioned UK-based Muslim NGOs operate within a paradigm of counter-terrorism 
legislation and humanitarian aid. I then focus on how they position themselves vis-á-vis the 
UK government, its counter-terrorism legislation and the mainstream humanitarian aid field. 
As a way to confine my subject to the influence of counter-terrorism legislation on the of 
work of Muslim NGOs and how they present themselves, I mainly focus on their religious 
identity and how it might influence a particular approach to humanitarian relief. Moreover, I 
discuss how these particular organizations negotiate with the humanitarian field and the 
realpolitik in the UK.  
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Chapter 3 
Case study of four UK-based Muslim NGOs; Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Islamic Aid 
and Interpal 
This chapter will focus on the organizational culture, the objectives, strategies and modus 
operandi of Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Interpal (Palestinians Relief and Development Fund) 
and Muslim Hands. Examining their decision-making tools as well as their statements and 
practices, it becomes particularly important to analyze how these organizations define and 
position themselves within the context of humanitarian aid and UK counter-terrorism 
legislation. This chapter draws on an analysis of the aforementioned Muslim NGOs drawing 
on aid cultures impacted by development aid as well as Islamic aid culture, in their own 
construction of aid ideologies.  
Marie Juul Petersen argues that transnational Muslim NGOs are best perceived as part 
of two different aid cultures: namely, development aid and Islamic aid.167 Working within the 
dichotomies of these two different aid cultures, the role of Muslim NGOs in the humanitarian 
aid field needs to be studied in this particular setting. Benthall summarizes this aspect stating, 
“Many international Islamic agencies classify themselves as NGOs and use the jargon of 
Western aid professionals… The tension between maintaining a distinctive religious 
character, and encouraging the professionalization of relief, remains a significant issue for 
Islamic welfare and relief organizations.” 168  This is particularly important since these 
circumstances both enable and interfere with the work of Muslim NGOs and are important to 
understand their self-perception and how British authorities perceive them. In that which 
follows I will therefore clarify the discourse of these organizations focusing on their 
organizational culture and characteristics. By using the term organizational culture, I mean “a 
set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines 	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how it perceives, thinks about and reacts to its various environments.”169 Organizational 
culture influences employees´ attitudes and behaviors and consists of collective values, beliefs 
and assumptions. 170  Examining the organizational culture of UK-based Muslim NGOs 
therefore clarifies their perception of the discourse on religion and aid and, sheds light on how 
and to which degree “Islam” and “religion” play a role in their day-to-day work.  
Currently, there are 56 Muslim NGOs identified working in the humanitarian relief 
and development field.171 Altogether the number of Muslim charities and trusts in the UK 
amounts to approximately 1000 organizations.172 Recently the number of Muslim NGOs in 
the UK is rising due to the ongoing crises in Syria, Iraq, the oPT and so many other 
emergencies and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Although it is difficult to 
speak of a homogenous UK Muslim relief and development NGO sector because of its 
diversity and a lack of shared identity and objectives, many of these organizations share 
concerns over unfair treatment after the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York City. In 
2007, five UK-based Muslim NGOs (Islamic Relief, Muslim Hands, Muslim Aid, Human 
Appeal International and Human Relief Foundation) established an umbrella organization – 
the Muslim Charities Forum - which aims “(…) to improve British Muslim charities 
contribution to international development by promoting the exchange of experience, ideas and 
information amongst the members, between networks of NGOs in the UK and internationally, 
with the Governments, and other bodies with the interest in international development.”173 
Traditionally, there were more Muslim NGOs established in the UK than in any other 
European country because of their transparent and simple charity legislation and policies as 
compared to other EU countries. Likewise two other factors have impacted the establishment 	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of more Muslim NGOs in the UK. First, there are sociological factors stemming from the 
1980s and 1990 when a second generation of the Muslim immigrant community in Britain 
grew up and became socially active. Although this generation had looser ties with their 
country of origin, culture and language of origin, they nevertheless identified with the Islamic 
faith as part of both their traditional identity and a transnational cultural framework.174 The 
second factor, which had an impact on the Muslim immigrant community in the UK, was (and 
still is) the influence of the global media. The broadcasting of crises and emergencies, 
especially in countries with large Muslim populations, to television audiences in the UK 
facilitated an overwhelming support for Muslim communities to get involved – in one way by 
establishing Muslim NGOs like Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Interpal and Muslim Hands. All 
of these organizations relevant to this thesis were established as a response to certain crises 
that took place during the 1980s and 1990s, such as the Soviet-Afghan war, the famine in 
Ethiopia or the Bosnian War.175 
 In the middle of the Soviet-Afghan war and the Ethiopian famine, Islamic Relief and 
Muslim Aid were established, while Islamic Relief was founded in 1984 by a group of 
medical student immigrants from Egypt. Muslim Aid was started in 1985 by the famous 
singer Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens). Both organizations had a period of growth during 
the Bosnian war in the 1990s.176 A while later in 1993, Muslim Hands was established as 
direct response to the Bosnian war, too.177 One year later Interpal was founded, focusing 
mainly on the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT), Jordan, Lebanon and, recently, Syria. 
Although three out of four Muslim NGOs examined in this thesis draw on Islamic values to 
legitimize their action, they do not consider themselves primarily “Islamic” but describe 	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themselves, for instance, as “an independent humanitarian and development organization,”178 
an international relief and development agency,” 179  and “international aid agency and 
NGO.”180 Framing their claims and strategies more or less entirely in the language of 
development and humanitarian relief culture, they nevertheless identify with Islamic values 
and embed them in their work, too. Interpal is the only organization relevant in this thesis, 
which does not use any religious symbols or Qur´anic citations neither on its homepage nor in 
their annual reports or booklets they published.181 
As abovementioned, there are two significant factors that lead to the foundation of 
numerous Muslim NGOs in the UK. First, the transparent and simple charity legislation and 
policies offer good conditions to establish a charity there and second, the social activism of 
the huge Muslim immigrant community that felt the need to help people in their countries of 
origin. Although these two factors seem to imply that it is relatively uncomplicated for 
Muslim NGOs in the UK it does not reveal the whole picture. After the 9/11 attacks, Muslim 
communities and organizations in Britain experienced Islamophobia, and were put under 
control by the government. This scrutiny was also felt among Muslim NGOs, specifically in 
relation to new counter-terrorism legislation. For a better understanding on how the counter-
terrorism legislation in the UK has an impact on Muslim NGOs it is necessary to take a look 
at their self-conception, organizational culture and their day-to-day work.  
Studying the organizational culture of UK-based Muslim NGOs below, I now turn to 
examine the ideology of these organizations. As aforementioned I understand ideology first 
and foremost as a study of (re) presentations, focusing on discourse, texts and rhetorical 
struggles analyzing how these organizations (re) present themselves. Therefore I focus on 
how and when they adjust their language either to development or Islamic values vocabulary.  
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Ideology of aid  
The primary language used by the four Muslim NGOs is that of mainstream development and 
humanitarian aid. Terms like “empowerment,” “poverty reduction,” or the Millennium 
Development Goals are mainstream development discourses with which these organizations 
engage in their annual reports and present on their websites.182 Muslim Aid´s chairman Dr. 
Manazir Ahsan states in the 2014 annual report: “Our prime focus has always been on 
delivering aid in the most effective way, and in recent years we have extended our aim to 
encourage sustainable living for communities.”183 Petersen argues that Islamic Relief builds 
its work on “Islamic humanitarian values” which are defined and adjusted to the values of the 
mainstream development and humanitarian aid field.184 Furthermore, she states that Muslim 
NGOs such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid claim to be legitimate providers of aid not 
because they are faith-based but professional.185 “Thus, in Islamic Relief, the discourse of 
development and humanitarian aid is the main language. Islam is presented as largely 
invisible and sharply divided from the organization´s aid activities, primarily relevant in 
relation to personal motivation and organizational values and always subsidiary to broader 
humanitarian and development principles.”186  
I agree with Petersen that the language of development and humanitarian relief 
discourse entered the language used by Muslim NGOs discussed here, partly because they are 
actors in the international humanitarian aid field and, partly because they had to adjust their 
language and organizational culture in order to underline their professionalism. 187  Providing 
policy research on topics like climate change, microfinance, gender justice and conflict 
transformation, Islamic Relief predominantly uses a professional language. Nevertheless, 
there is also a focus on policy research dealing with the faith perspective, which is covered in 	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reports on an Islamic perspective on human development, the rights of forced migrants in 
Islam, and on Islamic finance.188 “Muslim Aid tries to establish a non-religious image in its 
family support program or its coffee shop. Islamic Relief´s recent attempt to produce policy 
positions on key issues has perhaps led to a more over faith basis for its work than before, 
with policies on HIV and reproductive health underscored by Islamic evidences and fatawa 
(legal rulings).”189 
This dichotomy is not only obvious when looking at Islamic Relief or Muslim Aid, but 
it also holds true for other Muslim NGOs discussed in this thesis as well. Claims to 
professionalism and seeing themselves as part of the wider development and humanitarian 
environment as well as drawing on conceptions of religious values are both important factors 
one can recover in the organizational culture of these organizations. Although all of these 
organizations have adjusted their language to mainstream development discourse, different 
aspects of religiousness influence the vision and mission statements of three organizations I 
focus on. This is demonstrated, in part, by quoting of Qur’anic verses on their websites and in 
their published materials, as is the case for Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and Muslim Hands.190 
While Muslim Hands (figure 4)191 and Interpal (figure 3)192 do not use an Islamic symbol in 
their emblem, Islamic Relief (figure 2)193 has a mosque in its emblem and Muslim Aid (figure 
1)194 has integrated the crescent in their emblem.195 
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The way in which Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and Muslim Hands understand religion 
can be described as secular religiosity relegated to the spheres of personal motivation and 
underlying values. “Religious authority is first and foremost understood in terms of sharp 
distinction between religion and aid, echoing secular principles of the development culture. In 
this perspective, religion is acceptable as the source of individual values, underlying 
principles and motivation, but not as public rituals and collective practices influencing the 
ways in which aid is provided”196 This can be seen in the organizations vision and mission 
statements as well as in their publications. For example, Islamic Relief published a paper 
entitled “Faith and Identity in Practice.” Here they state that: “It (Islamic Relief) seeks to be 
both true to its faith and at the same time adhere to international humanitarian and 
accountability standards.”197 Moreover, in their Code of Conduct they emphasize their 
adherence to both the Islamic aid culture and the development aid culture: 
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The values and beliefs Islamic Relief adhere to stem from: The Ideological and 
spiritual inspiration contained in divine revelation and revealed through all oft he 
Creator´s messengers from Adam to Muhammad, and in the scriptures and guidance 
contained in revealed texts, culminating with the Qur´an. They also stem from the 
knowledge and practice gained over the years from dedicated and principled 
humanitarian workers, academics and professionals from all faiths and regions who 
have developed universally recognized good practice in this field.198 
Examining the influence of counter-terrorism legislation on Muslim NGOs it is important to 
understand the organization´s ideology of aid, because the way in which they define aid and 
for example recipients differs. Moreover it seems that these organizations wish to represent 
themselves as professional actors in the humanitarian aid field without any difference to 
secular NGOs or other FBO. Facing a dilemma, Muslim NGOs are forced on the one hand to 
proof more than other NGOs that they work professional and stick to international principles 
and be often more transparent then their secular counterparts. This ambition to become 
professional is directly related to the control of and suspicion towards Muslim NGOs after the 
9/11 attacks and the following “War on Terror”. Besides the control and suspicion by the 
British government and Charity Commission, Muslim NGOs have to deal with newly 
formulated “development and security” strategies by bilateral donors. 
These signify a general reorientation of assistance to address the causes of 
radicalization and extremism as well as to support southern governments to create 
their own counter-terrorism structures. This reorientation has channeled resources to 
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organizations and groups working within Muslim communities, where donors are 
seeking new engagement to build relations and counter radicalizations.199  
On the other hand, the Muslim NGOs I discuss here do want to underline their uniqueness in 
the humanitarian aid field. The argument here is that they are better equipped to work in 
Muslim environments. 
Mission / Objectives/ Strategies 
After I examined the organizational culture and ideology of Aid, I now analyze how the four 
Muslim NGOs formulate their mission statements and objectives by examining their 
strategies to achieve these aims. This however, gives an insight into how the organizations 
understand aid and whom they see as recipients of their aid. By framing recipients either in 
terms of religion or as part of a common humanity also shows which role faith plays in a 
particular Muslim NGO.  
 Formulating their charities aims, all four NGOs pay attention especially to the 
reduction of poverty and long-term development approaches. Furthermore their mission 
statements are not primarily spiritual but rather incorporate a terminology of mainstream 
development and humanitarian aid stating for example: “Poverty is an outrage against 
humanity. It robs people of dignity, freedom and hope, of power over their own lives. 
According to all four Muslim NGOs the provision of aid is not restricted to Muslims but they 
claim to deliver aid “regardless of ethnicity, creed or political persuasion and where 
required”200 similarly Muslim Hands formulates that “we believe that everyone, irrespective 
of race, color or faith has the fundamental right to a life of dignity, free of poverty and 
oppression.”201 Benthall states, “It (Islamic Relief) has adopted an impartial and neutral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 “Aid, Security and Civil Society in the Post -911 Context,” (briefing report of an International Workshop, 
organized by the center for Civil Society, London School of Economics, Goodenough College, London, 2007). 
200 “Muslim Aid Summary Information Return 2013,” Charity Commission, accessed May 3, 2015, 
http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/SIR/ENDS24%5C0000295224_SIR_20131231_E.PDF. 
201 “Muslim Hands Summary Information Return 2013,” Charity Commission, accessed May 5, 2015, 
http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/SIR/ENDS56%5C0001105056_SIR_13_E.PDF 
	   52	  
position in its humanitarian action, which allows assistance to be used to help people 
regardless of their religious affiliation. The slightly smaller Muslim Aid insists that its work 
should be used to benefit Muslims only.”202 Being no longer understood in terms of a Muslim 
ummah, recipients are perceived as part of a global humanity. Expression like these especially 
became more prominent after 9/11 when Muslim NGOs were objected to close scrutiny. 
Petersen argues that in earlier annual reviews and reports of both organizations, Islamic Relief 
and Muslim Aid discussed more “the Muslim Ummah,” or “projects to improve the quality of 
education and skills for younger Muslims.”203 Arguing that both organizations underwent a 
change in their language and strategies, they now emphasize their work with non-Muslims.204 
Although it holds true that all four organizations are claiming to provide aid to everyone 
regardless of their faith, etc., it also is obvious that they continue to work primarily in 
predominantly Muslim countries. Furthermore, they still play an important role, and envision 
themselves as advocates for an Islamic perspective on poverty and human rights. Islamic 
Relief just published “Islamic Relief Worldwide and the post 2015 process – Making Islamic 
perspectives heard.”205 In this report however the organization states:  
…Muslim majority countries and Islamically inspired institutions and organizations 
have not yet developed coherent, Islamically rooted policy positions of their own. 
Often this leaves them in a defensive position with respect to policies shaped at the 
UN. The particular values, priorities and contributions of the Ummah may be omitted 
or alienated if our voice is not heard. Given the importance of the Post 2015 Agenda 
for shaping global discussion, it is important that Muslim majority countries and 
institutions make their voices heard to clarify their priorities for sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation, including reforms to uphold justice and oppose 
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oppression in their own societies. Actively participating in this process is the best way 
of ensuring that the perspectives of Muslim majority countries are respected rather 
than ignored or worse attacked.206 
 Focusing on disaster relief and reduction of poverty, the organization´s strategies and 
projects are similar not only to the other Muslim NGOs mentioned in this thesis but also to 
development NGOs, FBO and secular alike. The four Muslim NGOs predominantly work in 
fields such as education, healthcare, livelihoods, emergency relief and food/water supply. 
Although each organization focuses on a particular field, all of them have at least one project 
in each of these sectors. As an immediate example, formulating their strategies in the 
language of mainstream development, Islamic Relief states, “Our projects provide poor 
people with access to vital services. We protect communities from disasters, and deliver life-
saving emergency aid. We provide lasting routes out of poverty, and empower vulnerable 
people to transform their lives and their communities.“207 Besides these projects, all four 
Muslim NGOs furthermore carry out projects in traditional fields of Islamic charities, such as 
the care for orphans, the distribution of food during Ramadan and other important Muslim 
feasts celebrated. As a part of Islamic aid culture, these projects were the first ones the 
abovementioned Muslim charities engaged in. Later on projects in development aid 
accompanied these programs.208 
 Although all four Muslim NGOs relevant to this thesis draw on notions of sustainable 
livelihoods and self-reliance, three of them constantly include religious vocabulary and 
symbols, albeit in different ways. Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and Muslim Hands base their 
work on Islamic values citing Qur´anic verses and hadith-literature. Defining poverty not in 
spiritual terms, it gives them the room to provide aid to everyone, including poor people 
regardless of their religion. Adjusting the spiritual and mainstream humanitarian language, 	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they balance a universalist approach, which sometimes clashes with certain donor 
expectations when it comes to traditional concepts of donating, such as zakat.209 However the 
organizations use strategies of ambivalence and pragmatic arguments in order to satisfy both 
the donors and the international humanitarian aid field. “In order to overcome the schism 
between mainstream development ideals and religious wishes of donors, there is a constant 
attempt on the part of the organisations to adjust the religious activities to development 
strategies through ideological negotiations.”210 One part of doing this and not seeing religious 
activities as an integrated part of aid provision, is to relegate these activities for example to 
religious holidays. This however, can be seen in Muslim Aid´s, Islamic Relief´s and Muslim 
Hand´s projects during Ramadan for example. Interpal is the exception of the organizations I 
studied for this thesis. As a Muslim NGO, Interpal does not use any religious symbols or 
references to the Qur´an or hadith-literature. Neither in its vision and mission statements nor 
in other publications or on its websites are there any statements that would indicate that 
religion plays a role in its organizational culture. Interpal therefore can be conceptualized as a 
Muslim NGO but not as FBO. Therefore it is distinct from the four organizations relevant for 
this thesis. Among the four examined, Interpal was investigated three times by the Charity 
Commission.211  
Despite of their different understanding and identification with “Islam” these 
organizations have huge annual budgets on hand, playing a significant role in humanitarian 
and disaster relief. Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid, two of the largest Muslim NGOs in the 
UK, have huge annual budgets from £4,543,620 to £82,814,292 and are able to raise funds not 
only among Muslim communities but also from international donors such as the UK 
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government, the UN, and the World Bank.212 Despite increasing institutional funding, all four 
Muslim NGOs raise most of their donations from individual donors. Muslim Aid, for 
instance, has 30,000-40,000 regular individual donors.213   
 Balancing between individual donors but also depending on institutional and 
governmental funding Muslim NGOs in the UK are forced to recapitulate their image of how 
they are being perceived especially by the British government. These factors combined with 
the increasing control and suspicion that these organizations are confronted with because of 
the counter-terrorism legislation and the “War on Terror” led to a change to professionalism. 
In the next paragraph I therefore discuss this trend.  
Change to Professionalism and Mainstream Development - Responding to an increase in 
Suspicion and Control 
Jonathan Benthall argues that the geopolitical events between 1990-1992 marked a turning 
point for Islamic charities because increased control by governments during the 1990-1991 
Gulf War, led to the adoption of a sharp demarcation between aid on the one hand and jihad 
on the other hand.214 By taking on a strategy of neutrality and denying being involved in the 
conflict of the Bosnian war, Muslim NGOs tried to ensure their legitimacy. Benthall describes 
two main developments during this period that led to a change within the organizations. First, 
Muslim charities isolated themselves from political and paramilitary action and second, “a 
wish to professionalize and accept effectiveness as an indispensable condition of recognition 
for any ‘humanitarian agency,’”215 These two developments provoked tensions and resistance 
within the organizations themselves and also in the Muslim community.216 Despite the 
depoliticization of Muslim NGOs during this period, they did not try to imitate secular NGOs 	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but rather tried to promote a specific form of humanitarianism rooted in Islamic traditions, 
such as almsgiving, and charitable activities, such as the caring for orphans.217 Nevertheless, 
like any other NGO, Muslim NGOs became more prominent social actors and therefore their 
organizational structures and staff became more professionalized as well.218 
 This internal conflict was often held between more militant founders of Muslim NGOs 
and professional managers. Mahmoud Hassan, founder of Islamic Aid, became executive 
director of Muslim Aid in 1993 before he established his own Muslim NGO. Trying to reform 
the organization through recruiting professional staff, he defended his policy and faced 
resistance from the board of trustees who had no experience in the relief and development 
fields.219 Furthermore, there was tension in the transition from “Islamic solidarity” to “Islamic 
Humanitarians, “; which has been most obvious in the campaigning of both Islamic Relief and 
Muslim Aid. Both organizations refute allegations that they support political activities, 
defending their position as strictly humanitarian although their programs still maintain a 
strong communitarian character, symbolically binding Muslim donors and beneficiaries.220 
Drawing on their own conception of aid, though foregrounding their adherence to the 
principle of the universality of aid, allows them to provide assistance to Muslims and non-
Muslims - although there is still a priority in helping Muslims.221 
 As it can be seen in three out of the four case studies mentioned above, UK-based 
Muslim NGOs tend on the one hand to professionalize but on the other hand they are still 
rooted in traditions of Islamic aid culture and do legitimize themselves also through their 
religion. Benthall argues that by no means the evolution of Muslim NGOs should be 
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perceived as a process where de-politicization and professionalization automatically lead to 
secularization.222  
Arguing that Muslim NGOs tend to be clearer about their faith identity because of 
their younger, more homogenous staff and because they are less dependent on public funds 
and thus less influenced by secular environment, Rick James also contends in his Praxis Paper 
“What is so distinctive about FBOs? – How European FBOs define and operationalize their 
faith,” that staff politics, an aspect of organization culture to which I now turn, is also 
important.223 Although I acknowledge the point he makes here, I do not agree with him. I 
would argue, that Muslim NGOs depend on secular donors - like governments and other 
institution - and are therefore influenced by secular environment and have to care about their 
representation. Adjusting their language to the mainstream development and humanitarian aid 
field is only one example. Although the number of young staff members rises due to internal 
changes, the boards of trustees’ stays mainly unchanged. Additionally Islamic Relief and 
Muslim Aid in recent years employ more women and non-Muslims.224 Therefore these 
changes led to a very heterogeneous staff constellation, carrying with it internal conflicts and 
different views on how aid is perceived. 
Although counter-terrorism legislation has an impact on the internal structures of 
Muslim NGOs in the UK, there is another factor that I will discuss in the next paragraph. 
When analyzing Muslim NGOs in the context of the UK´s “ War on Terror” it is vital to 
critically examine the organizations position vis á vis the British authorities and the Charity 
Commission. Hence I study the relation between these different stakeholders. 
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Positioning vis à vis British Authorities and Charity Commission  
Examining the organizational culture of the abovementioned Muslim NGOs as well as 
their struggle in the humanitarian aid field concerning counter-terrorism legislation, it is vital 
to explore their positioning vis-á-vis the UK parliament and the Charity Commission, which 
implement, control, and monitor these legislations. As a result of Britain’s transparent and 
simple charity legislation and policies compared to other countries, such as France or the US, 
coupled with governmental ideologies of multiculturalism, these initiatives encouraged 
Muslims to establish charity organizations and create a stable foundation for good 
partnership.225 Approaching a different road than the US government in the treatment of 
Muslim NGOs, British authorities intensified their cooperation with Muslim NGOs in the 
aftermath of 9/11. Especially Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief were seen as ideal partners to 
promote dialogue initiatives during this period. Both organizations have regular contact and 
interaction with politicians and the British royal family.226 Islamic Relief, for example, was 
the first Muslim organization Prince Charles visited after 9/11. Former Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown thanked Muslim Aid at its 25th anniversary dinner, stating, “For a quarter of a 
century the valuable work Muslim Aid has been doing means that millions of people across 
the world are today safer and healthier. I wish Muslim Aid and its passionate and committed 
staff and supporters the very best for another 25 years of achievement.”227 Although there is 
no evidence that Muslim NGOs had troubles with the Charity Commission in the past, the 
appointment of William Shawcross as chairman gave cause for concern amongst them. 
Stating that they welcomed the role of the Charity Commission and acknowledged that there 
was a need to strengthen the Commission, the Muslim Charity Forum accredit a good 
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understanding of the sector to the Charity Commission. 228 Yet they too expressed concerns 
about the appointment of Shawcross, arguing that his criticized interview, in which he stated 
that Islamist extremism is the “most deadly” problem, is reason for concern. 229  
Strategies of association and national identity play an important role when it comes to 
the relation between British authorities and UK-based Muslim NGOs in the context of 
counter-terrorism legislation. Shared British values are a priority on the agenda of the 
government on which to base its Counter-Extremism Bill. 230  The four Muslim NGOs 
examined in this thesis associate themselves with their ties to Britain. For example, Interpal is 
“a British registered non-political charity working on the ground in the Occupied Territories 
of the West Bank and Gaza.”231 Besides the identification with British Values, the partnership 
with the government and other British organizations is a variable in which the position vis á 
vis the British authorities reflects itself.  
 Fostering partnership not only with other Muslim NGOs but also with other FBOs and 
secular NGOs, all four Muslim NGOs work in functional networks within the international 
humanitarian aid field. For example Islamic Relief has consultative status with the UN 
Economic and Social Council; it is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the international 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO’s Disaster Relief, and a member of British 
Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND).232 Moreover as the largest Muslim NGO in the 
world, Islamic Relief is both a member of the Disasters Emergency Committee, an 
organization that raises funds for an elite of British NGOs, and as an operational partner with 
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Oxfam and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD).233 Similarly, Muslim 
Aid works together with Save the Children, Christian Aid, and World Vision, to name just a 
few, and has consultative status at the UN, too.234 Muslim Hands has partnerships with the 
UN, WWF, War Child, Christian Aid, and DFID.235 For Interpal as of this writing, there was 
not enough published information accessible on their partnership, but that they are mainly 
cooperating with local organizations.236 To promote partnership between Muslim and non-
Muslim NGOS and aiming to strengthen these partnerships, Hany el-Banna, founder of 
Islamic Relief, established in cooperation with Oxfam and the British Red Cross, the 
Humanitarian Forum.237 All of these examples given above proof that Muslim NGOs are not 
operating within a vacuum and are open to partnership and interchange with other 
organizations in the humanitarian aid field. This also has an effect on their relation to British 
Authorities and the way these organizations are perceived by the government.  
 Embodying inter-faith dialogue and bridge-building, partnerships between Muslim 
NGOs and Christian NGOs are very popular with the British government. At least three out of 
the four Muslim NGOs examined above cooperate with Christian FBOs. When Muslim Aid 
signed its partnership agreement with the United Methodist Committee on Relief in 2007, 
former treasury Minister Stephen Timm´s reaction reflected the British government´s support 
for cross-national and trans-faith partnership.238 Furthermore, former Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown mentioned this partnership in a 2008 speech to the UN Inter-Faith Conference, 
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bringing up the collaboration between these two organizations as an example of “the potential 
of faith.”239 
 While emphasizing interfaith dialogue and partnership with other FBOs and secular 
NGOs, most of these organizations are still driven by a religiously defined sense of solidarity. 
Negotiating between their predominantly individual Muslim donors and a universalist 
humanitarian approach, Muslim NGOs still have to legitimize how aid is conceived. Although 
increased control and scrutiny towards Muslim NGOs intensified in the aftermath of 9/11, 
these measures of control already began in the 1990s. Nevertheless their partnership with 
other organizations in the humanitarian aid field and with the British government show that 
they are important actors in humanitarian and development aid and are therefore appreciated 
by British authorities. In the next chapter I critically engage with the consequences of 
suspicion and control on the day-to-day work of the organizations discussed above. In 
addition I provide an analysis and outlook on the current situation of Muslim NGOs and new 
challenges they face when working in high risk zones such as Syria, Iraq or the oPT.   
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Chapter 4 
Muslim NGOs under Surveillance – Justified Suspicion or Untenable Prejudice  
After examining the UK government´s and Charity Commissions counter-terrorism 
legislation and discussing the ideologies of aid and modus operandi of four UK-based Muslim 
NGOs this chapter examines the influence of the former on the latter. Counter-terrorism laws 
undermine the independence and neutrality of humanitarian organizations in general and are 
likely to become an additional factor in the unraveling of the legitimacy and acceptance of 
humanitarian responses, especially in high-risk conflict zones such as Syria, Iraq, and Somalia 
or lately in Yemen, places that have been infiltrated by various terrorist organization.240  
Criticizing the UK´s counter-terrorism laws for being too vague and open to wide 
interpretation, Muslim NGOs believe they are being disproportionality impaired by these 
laws. Subject to greater scrutiny and held in greater suspicion than other UK-based NGOs by 
the government and the Charity Commission, they also experienced discrimination by some 
banks that limit their access to financial services.241 Since 1998, the Charity Commission has 
conducted only 20 inquiries into suspected links with terrorism, ten of which have since been 
dropped. At the same time, more than 1,000 Islamic charities and trusts in the UK have been 
exposed to extraordinary levels of scrutiny under anti-terrorism legislation.242 
In 2004 the Humanitarian Forum was initiated by Islamic Relief to foster partnerships 
and cooperation between Western humanitarian organizations and Muslim NGOs in Europe 
and in Muslim-majority countries. Aiming to support Muslim NGOs in joint capacity-
building, advocating for a legal framework for greater transparency and promoting 
humanitarian principles and standards, this initiative highlights the demand for action and 
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proactive change within the Muslim charity sector.243 A similar project, the “Islamic Charities 
Project,” formerly known as the “Montreux Initative,” was launched in 2005 by the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, aiming to remove unjustified obstacles for Muslim 
charities.244 Concerned with the inappropriate application of counter-terrorism laws and the 
discrimination of Muslim NGOs, these initiatives point out that Muslim NGOs have to deal 
with unfairly suspicion and are impacted by counter-terrorism legislation. In what follows, I 
focus on different areas that are important to Muslim NGOs to manage their day-to-day work, 
but which are hindered by counter-terrorism legislation either directly or indirectly. These 
areas encompass the access to financial services that are important to transfer funds to 
projects overseas but are restricted by the banking sector. Additionally I focus on the damage 
to their reputations when being investigated by the Charity Commission or being 
discriminated by the media. Another point I touch upon is the problem Muslim NGOs face 
when it comes to transparency, and the administrative burden they have to deal with. 
Examining these areas provides an insight into the obstacles counter-terrorism legislation can 
pose to Muslim NGOs.  
Influence of the UK´s Counter-Terrorism Legislation on the Everyday Work of Transnational 
Muslim NGOs 
Although the whole humanitarian sector experiences the impact of counter-terrorism 
legislation, Muslim NGOs have been most severely afflicted. The range of regulatory 
measures that have been introduced has led to the rise of not only operating costs, but also to 
the slowing down of administrative functions, the curtailing of funds, the undermining of 
partnerships, the preventing of access, and the altering of the quality and coordination of 
assistance.245 Moreover, confusing and inconsistent formulations of counter-terrorism laws 
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have contributed to the negative consequences these organizations have had to face. For 
example, the broad interpretation of the definition of “material support” subject to fear that 
even straightforward humanitarian activities such as the provision of school supplies, could be 
seen as prosecutable action.246 A study published in 2007 by the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) suggest that counter-terrorism regulations focusing on the 
risk of the charity sector would have the opposite effect to that which was intended, 
“undermining rather than protecting the interests of charities and their ability to provide aid to 
those who need it most and distracting attention from the particular risks that leave some 
organisations vulnerable to abuse by terrorist.” 247 Especially the access to financial service 
can have a tremendous impact on the ability to provide aid to people in need. In 2014 and in 
early 2015, several banks in the UK froze bank accounts of Muslim NGOs without even 
informing the charities about their procedure.248 
As a charity with an Islamic background working in the polarized context of Palestine 
is more likely to be investigated and controlled for working with local partners seen as 
prohibited groups by international funders and governments. As such, Interpal was subject 
three times to a Charity Commission investigation in 1996, 2003 and, most recently between 
2008-2009, although they were later cleared.249 Although the Commission found that there 
was insufficient evidence to conclude that Interpal had organizational links to Hamas and the 
organizations’ bank accounts were released, Interpals humanitarian work in the oPT was 
undoubtedly disrupted, and donor confidence in the organization may have been 
undermined. 250  Yet Interpal still remains a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
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organization” on the US Specially Designated Nationals List.251 According to the organization 
the damage to their reputation still causes them troubles to carry out their work and to raise 
funds. In the booklet published for their 20th anniversary, they state, “The designation, 
however, continues to have a negative effect on the charity, with the banking system in 
particular making it almost impossible to transfer funds overseas for fear of provoking legal 
action in US courts for offering ‘material assistance’ to a ‘terrorist’ organization.”252 What 
makes it so complicated for charities like Interpal is that organizations like Hamas are not per 
se prohibited but that every country has its own list of banned organizations. For instance, in 
the UK only the radical wing of Hamas, the Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigade, is 
proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000; However the EU and the US have designated 
Hamas as a whole, including its political wing, on its terror list.253  
Financial Service 
Access to financial service to transfer funds is tremendously important for charities working 
overseas. Any restriction or delays can endanger charities, their partners and projects 
influencing not at least the recipients of aid. Why is it then that banks are targeting charities 
and interrupting their ability to provide aid? Moreover why do they hazard the consequences 
of driving charitable giving into less regulated channels? 254 Delays in the transfer of funds 
have become the norm for most Muslim NGOs in the UK, including also organizations that 
are in full compliance with counter-terrorism legislation.255 Officials of UK-based Muslim 
NGOs told al Jazeera that “access to banking facilities is vital for transparency and good 
governance and (that they) fear that fundraising and aid work in Muslim communities could 
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otherwise be driven underground.“ 256 
 In 2014 and 2015 British Muslim NGOs fell under increased scrutiny based on 
concerns that first, British citizens intent on fighting in Syria would use these organizations to 
travel to conflict zones and second, fears that donations raised in the UK could go to extremist 
groups. 257 The Guardian, Vice Magazine and The Telegraph published articles in August 
2014 claiming that HSBC, a British bank, sent out letters to Muslim NGOs stating “that 
services could no longer be provided because they fell out of bank´s ‘risk appetite.’”258 
Although it seems that UK banks target Muslim NGOs, this is not because they are actively 
seeking to shut down Muslim NGOs, but rather as a result of the regions in which these 
organizations predominantly operate. 259 Dr. El-Banna, director of Muslim Charities Forum, 
expressed concerns regarding the banking sector and the Charity Commission, stating that the 
banks “do not respect our Charity Commission, because they give authority to stop transfer to 
a registered organization in a country – a credible organization, a new one or an old one. They 
close bank accounts without considering the role of the Charity Commission. The banking 
industry is now playing a very difficult role.”260  
 Stringent money laundering and counter-terrorism legislation force the banking sector 
to take a cautious approach when dealing with the money of charity organizations, with the 
result that these organizations are treated guilty unless proven innocent. 261 David Anderson, 
an independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, expressed that there are “acute concerns 
within the charitable sector regarding banks withdrawing or curtailing services to NGOs, 
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resulting in delays or obstacles to the transfer of funds.”262 Furthermore, he warned that there 
“is a risk that necessary anti-terrorism laws will be given a bad name if they resulting 
avoidable restrictions on the ability of NGOs to conduct vital humanitarian and peace 
building operations in parts of the world from which terrorism emanates.”263 
 Taking a closer look on the banking perspective in their report “UK Humanitarian Aid 
in the age of counterterrorism – perceptions and reality,” Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, Tom 
Keating and Sara Pantuliano examine two factors influencing the way banks deal with British 
NGOs. On the one hand, charities are not particularly profitable for banks; on the other hand, 
banks consider that dealing with charities increases their vulnerability to risk of censure or 
dines under counter-terrorism legislation.264 Furthermore a lack of specific guidance from the 
government on “how banks should interpret UK legislation pertaining to terrorist financing 
has left them with little option but to take a broadly risk-averse approach for fear of finding 
themselves in breach of the law.”265 
Reputation 
Reputation is a charities most vulnerable possession and can be easily damaged by false 
allegations from the media or investigations carried out by the Charity Commission, 
regardless if the charity will be found guilty or innocent.266 Although there is a threat to the 
charity sector of abuse by individuals or organizations supporting extremism or terrorist 
activities, charities argue that the UK government and the media overestimate these incidents. 
Cases in which the media reported on Muslim NGOs, incorrectly accusing them of having 
links to proclaimed terrorist organizations or individuals linked to terrorism, occur quite often. 
In 2014 Muslim Aid responded to an article published in The Telegraph that wrongly accused 	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them of “funding organisations closely linked to the banned terror groups Hamas and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”267 Giving the impression that abuse is pervasive in the charity 
sector, this has implications on the day-to-day work of these organizations. Indeed, measured 
against the size of the charity sector, such incidents are small in number. Nevertheless, 
Muslim NGOs are especially perceived to be vulnerable to abuse. In 2013 Muslim Aid was 
subject to suspicion because three teenagers from Birmingham, were volunteering for the 
organization, collecting money on the streets. In fact they misused the name of the charity to 
receive donations and transferred the money to groups affiliated with terrorism.268 But it is not 
only Muslim NGOs that have to deal with incidents like this and are worried about their 
reputation. The UN World Food Program (WFP) was heavily concerned at the beginning of 
2015 when they found out that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)269 was using 
food parcels of their program and had pasted over the WFP printed logos read “Islamic State 
Syria.”270 
 Incidents like these concern Muslim NGOs that the Charity Commission´s counter-
terrorism legislation and rules unfairly target them. In the written response to the consultation 
on the “Draft Protection of Charities Bill,” the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF) voiced 
concerns that publications of the Charity Commission on ongoing inquiries could damage the 
reputation of the charity and that this influences donors and banks decisions on supporting the 
charity under surveillance. MCF has since recommended that before a warning is made 
public, the process should be laid out in the Bill should be both clear and transparent 
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process.271 Furthermore they are concerned with the direct costs for a wrongfully investigated 
charity responding to a Charity Commissions investigation. Therefore they urge that the 
Charity Commission “must proactively ‘rehabilitate’ the reputation and functioning of a 
charity that it has publicly reprimanded and not closed. The Charity Commission should 
endeavor in all cases where misconduct has not been found, to repeatedly defend the charity 
in the press and issue a clear public statement exonerating the charity.”272 A further point of 
concern to charities in the UK was the Charity Commission´s involvement in the 
government´s counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT, which led to a less independent function 
of the Commission.273  
Risk Management  
Working in conflict zones, negotiating access to the needy and the need for guarantees for 
safety and staff inevitably forces Muslim NGOs to engage with prohibited groups like ISIL, 
Al Shabaab or Hamas. Therefore these organizations often see themselves in the position to 
establish costly risk management measures in order to first, minimize their own risk to be 
abused by individuals or groups with links to terrorism or extremis and second, be more 
transparent and credible vis á vis donors and their governments at home. Moreover higher risk 
exposure for Muslim NGOs relates to the challenges they face in balancing Islamic concepts 
of charity with professional institutional standards. Like already discussed in this thesis 
Muslim NGOs highly depend on individual funding from their local communities, but are 
furthermore dependent on those local Muslim communities to legitimize themselves as 
“Muslim organizations”. Moreover Muslim NGOs are often blamed that trustees have 
individual links to proscribed groups or individuals. Often discussed in the media, these 
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incidents often stem from a lack of understanding amongst Muslim NGOs, politicians and 
their local communities of the difference between charity and “political activism”.274 
 To prevent fraud, Muslim NGOs like Islamic Relief are instituting increasingly robust 
risk management based on professional standards that are specifically related to counter 
terrorism-measures. Screening staff, partners and beneficiaries against lists of proscribed 
groups or individuals requires financial resources and are therefore only feasible for NGOs 
with a high budget. Additionally it is reported that some Muslim NGOs screen all donations 
above $8000, despite the significant administrative burden this imposes.275 Although some of 
these measures embraced by Muslim NGOs to protect themselves from terrorist abuse are a 
necessary and welcomed step towards more transparency, the ongoing humanitarian crises in 
Syria and Iraq pose new challenges to the humanitarian sector as a whole and Muslim NGOs 
in particular. In the following paragraph I focus on these new challenges concerning counter-
terrorism legislation as well as humanitarian work.  
Muslim NGOs and the Syrian Crisis – New challenges for counter-terrorism legislation and 
humanitarian work 
An article published in the 2011volume of International Review of the Red Cross deals with 
humanitarian engagement under counter-terrorism and how humanitarian organizations have 
to be mindful of both counter-terrorism legislation and humanitarian law although both do 
contradict each other.276 More recently in 2014 and interrelated to the crisis in Syria, three 
studies have been published dealing with the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on 
humanitarian aid in Syria.277 Furthermore the Charity Commission has published guidelines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Ibid, 11.  
275 Pantuliano and others, “Counter-Terrorism and Humanitarian Action,”.7.  
276 Naz K. Modirzadeh and others, “Humanitarian Engagement under Counter-Terrorism,” International Review 
of the Red Cross 93, no. 883 (2011). 
277Eva Svoboda, “Aid and the Islamic State - Adressing needs in Syria,” IRIN/HPG Crisis Brief (2014). Jessica 
Burniske and others, “Counter-Terrorism laws and regulations – What aid agencies need to know,” Overseas 
Development Institute (2014). 
	   71	  
on how to donate safely to charities working in Syria.278 Between 2013 and 2014 the Charity 
Commission carried out full statutory inquiries into five British NGOs working in Syria – all 
of which are Muslim NGOs. Newly founded charities and aid convoys are under closer 
scrutiny since the government fears that it might be an easy way for Britons to join terrorist 
groups in Syria.  
 At stake is not only the counter-terrorism legislation´s impact on the humanitarian 
organizations themselves but also on International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Aforementioned 
counter-terrorism laws impact the way humanitarian actors can engage with prohibited 
groups. Although IHL clearly provides humanitarian actors to offer services to all parties of a 
conflict, some actors fear the consequence of doing so. Additionally the failure to engage with 
different parties of the conflict limits the ability to provide aid to the populations under the 
control of these groups. Among others, Sara Pantuliano argues, “Whilst IHL balances the 
principle of military necessity with that of humanity, and places limits on the waging of war, 
the application of a counter-terrorism framework to conflict threatens to erode those limits 
and with them the ability of persons affected by conflict to receive humanitarian protection 
and assistance.”279  
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Conclusion  
This thesis contends that the British government’s counter-terrorism legislation and strategy 
impact UK-based Muslim NGOs on different levels. As this thesis draws on key aspects of 
the literature and organizational material, it becomes obvious that counter-terrorism 
legislation does influence Muslim NGOs in their organizational culture and how they perceive 
and locate themselves vis á vis the British authorities and the mainstream development aid 
field. Promoting and individualized religiosity subordinated to discourse and practice of the 
mainstream development and humanitarian aid field, these organizations place themselves 
within the “War on Terror” discourse, functioning as bridge builders between “Islam” and 
“the West.” It is this dichotomy of the two different aid cultures that is recurrent when 
looking at the positioning of the NGOs, Interpal, Muslim Hands, Muslim Aid and Islamic 
Relief. Moreover it is in the light of these dichotomies in which these organizations also aim 
to become more “professional” and to adjust their language to the mainstream development 
aid field. This becomes important also because the “War on Terror” has brought “Muslims 
within the gaze of donor agencies, a gaze, however, that constructs Muslims as 
problematic.”280 
Besides Muslim NGOs must raise standards with regard to risk management and 
accountability effecting particularly small organizations and their budget since these measures 
are expensive. Remarkably the financial service of Muslim NGOs in the UK is limited due to 
the perception of banks, which view Muslim NGOs as higher risk because of the locations in 
which they work. The example of Interpal is a case-in-point: the organization had to work 
hard to regain the trust of donors and the government after it was investigated and then 
cleared.  
 Discussing the issue of the influence of counter-terrorism legislation on UK-based 
Muslim NGOs, it is evident that a lack of proportionality has fueled negative perceptions on 	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all sides. Therefore all stakeholders must unify in an open and truthful dialogue to address the 
negative impacts of counter-terrorism legislations. The consequences for Muslim NGOs are 
only one aspect of a wider problem these legislations are posing to a wider British Muslim 
community and I would argue to the British society as well. Debates on shared national 
identity, integration and multiculturalism as well as on the importance of British values have 
to be revisited in light of a growing Islamophobia and atmosphere of fear.281 In this context 
British Muslim NGOs can figure as a key role in mediating between the actors.  
The “War on Terror” has emboldened governments to institute new counter-terrorism 
legislations. These legislations affect adversely fundamental human rights and individual 
liberties as well as it impacts certain communities, predominantly Muslim, that have come 
under suspicion in a context of anxieties and fears over “Islamic fascism”.282 Although there 
is a real terrorist threat to the UK the presumed threat by terrorist abuse to the charity sector is 
overestimated. This overreaction against Muslim NGOs as well as increased suspicion and 
control does hamper the organizations work in high risk zones and damages their reputation.  
The lack of support for Muslim NGOs in the UK to help them address their shortcomings in 
accountability and transparency, and the rhetoric about their funding for terrorism continues. 
In this respect it needs more initiatives like the Humanitarian Forum or the Islamic Charities 
Project, to help foster partnership and a better understanding of Muslim NGOs. Moreover the 
way forward is to enable a more open and informed debate about Muslim NGOs in the UK 
and the influence of counter-terrorism legislation on civil society. To engage with Muslim 
NGOs as partners not as enemies is a step forward. Like Mohammed Kroessin formulates it: 
“Their vilification must end, and they must be helped to better engage with the mainstream 
humanitarian community, since their contribution to relief and development is considerable. 
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Any further fallout from the ill-directed “War on Terror” will only make the problem more 
deep-rooted, whilst the victims of today´s greatest evil, poverty, remain unaided.”283 
In which direction the British government will lead its counter-terrorism legislation 
and deal with Muslim NGOs has to be seen in the future months and years. This debate 
however, is not only about Muslim NGOs but includes Muslim transnationalism and 
questions on national identity and cultural proximity. For the wider development and 
humanitarian aid field, questions of how counter-terrorism regimes affect their partners 
overseas and the debate on humanitarian principles in view of counter-terrorism operations 
and changing military competencies will be vital discussions to deal with.  
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